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First Amendment
I. The News Media and the First Amendment

Punishing Breaches of the COl!fidentiality of Judicial R~'view
Commissions: Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia

.. A.

In Landmark Communications~ Inc. v. Virginia, I the Supreme
Court addressed the problem of accommodating a state's legitimate interest in maintaining the confidentiality of proceedings before a state
judicial review commission2 with the First Amendment guarantee that
the news media shall be free of restrictions in discussing governmental
affairs.3 The Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute4 which
made it a misdemeanor for any person to divulge information concerning proceedings before the state's Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. 5 The Court's decision in Landmark serves to underscore the
protection afforded the news media by the First Amendment when it
engages in the "free discussion of governmental affairs."6
1. The Virginia Supreme Court Decision

The facts underlying the Landmark litigation are relatively simple. Landmark Communications, Inc., publishes The l'irginian-Pilot,
a general circulation newspaper in the Tidewater area of Virginia. On
October 4, 1975, the Pilot published an article stating in pertinent part
that the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (hereinafter Commission) had conducted a "formal hearing -concerning possible disciplinary action against" a judge in Norfolk, Virginia. The newspaper
account included the judge's name, and went on to state that the hear7

1. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
2. Id. at 835. In recognition of this interest, the Court cited W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO
JUDGES THE JUDGES 161-62 (1971); Buckley, The Commission on Judicial Qual!ftcations: An
Allemptto Deal with Judicial Misconduct, 3 U.S.F.L. REV. 244,255-56 (\969).
3. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). In Mills, the Court upheld the right ofa
newspaper to publish an election day editorial urging voters to support changing their form
of government. The Court noted: "Whatever differences there may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement th.lt a major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Id. at 218
(footnote omitted).
4. VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1973).
5. This commission was created pursuant to VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10, which provides,
inter alia, for the creation of a commission "vested with the power to investigate . . .
charges which would be the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge."
6. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). See note 3 supra.
7. Except where otherwise noted, this summary of the facts is taken from the opinion
of the Virginia Supreme Court. See Landmark Communications, Inc. \'. Virginia, 217 Va.
699, 701-03, 233 S.E.2d 120, 122-23 (1977).
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ing "apparently stemmed from charges of incompetence against the
. . . judge." On November 5, 1975, Landmark was indicted for violating Virginia Code section 2.1-37.13, which provides that "[a]ll papers
filed with and proceedings before the Commission . . . including the
identification of the subject judge . . . shall be confidential and shall
not be divulged by any person to anyone except the Commission, except that the record of any proceeding filed with the Supreme Court
shall lose its confidential character."s The code further provides that
"[a]ny person who shall divulge information in violation ... of this
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."9 In the subsequent trial, the
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk found Landmark guilty of violating section 2.1-37.13 and fined the corporation the sum of $500.00.
Landmark appealed its conviction to the Supreme Court of Virginia. lO Its initial contention was that the statute's proscription against
divulging information regarding Commission proceedings was ambiguous in that it failed to indicate whether its sanctions applied only to
participants in the proceedings or also to nonparticipating observers
such as the news media. Landmark argued that the statute's penal nature required that any such ambiguity be resolved against the Commonwealth and in favor of the alleged violator. II The newspaper
urged the Virginia court to construe section 2.1-37.13 to mean that a
violation would occur only upon "the first act of disclosure . . . by an
individual who had actually participated in some manner in the proceedings of [the] Commission." 12 Under such a construction,
Landmark contended, the statute had been violated not by the newspaper but by the Commission participant who first disclosed the confidential information. Landmark's subsequent publication of information
"voluntarily andfreely given to it" was therefore outside the scope of
the statute. 13 The major constitutional argument raised by Landmark
on appeal was that the imposition of the statute's criminal sanctions
"would unconstitutionally abridge its First Amendment guaranty of
freedom of the press."14 Landmark argued that the statute either constituted an impermissible prior restraint l5 or imposed a subsequent
8. VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1973).
9. Id.
10. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. 699, 233 S.E.2d 120 (1977).
11. £d. at 701,233 S.E.2d at 122.
12. £d. at 702, 233 S.E.2d at 122-23 (emphasis in original).
13. Id,233 S.E.2d at 123 (emphasis in original).
14. £d. at 703, 233 S.E.2d at 123.
15. Id. at 704, 233 S.E.2d at 124. Landmark based this contention on the decisions of
the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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punishment for publication without satisfying the requisite "clear and
present danger" elements necessary to impose such punishment. 16
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Landmark's statutory
construction argument, holding that the statute was clear and unambiguous in its terms and that its proscription applied to any person (including corporate entities) who divulged information' regarding
Commission proceedings before a complaint was filed with the state
supreme courtY Turning to the constitutional claim, the state court
disagreed with Landmark's contention that the statute imposed a prior
restraint, finding instead that its provisions fit more properly into the
subsequent punishment category. 18 This characterization compelled
the court to subject the statute to a clear and present danger analysis.
The court examined and then distinguished the administration of justice cases cited by Landmark. 19 Whereas those cases inyolved a court's
common law power of contempt, and thus arose from the exercise of
judicial power, the Virginia Supreme Court observed that the instant
case was based on the violation of a statute designed to protect a legislatively determined state interest. 20 The court asserted that the requirement of confidentiality was essential to preserve the legitimate state
interest in maintaining the effectiveness of the Commission and ensuring the orderly administration of justiceY The Virginia Supreme
Court concluded its opinion by accepting the Commonwealth's position that criminal sanctions are a legitimate and necessary means to
protect those state interests and prevent the clear and present danger
16. 217 Va. at 705, 233 S.E.2d at 124. Landmark relied on a line of cases which had
applied the "clear and present danger" test in overturning contempt citations based on media criticism of the manner in which courts were handling pending matters. These cases are
discussed i'!fra: Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp \. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
While the contempt citations stemmed from a perceived threat to "the Nderly administration of justice," the Supreme Court held in each case that expression critt.:aI ofa court or its
operations is protected by the First Amendment unless it poses a clear and present danger to
the system. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 449-59
(1970); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 623-31 (5th ed. 1978).
17. 217 Va. at 702-03, 233 S.E.2d at 123.
18. Id. at 704, 233 S.E.2d at 124.
19. See note 16 supra.
20. 217 Va. at 707-08, 233 S.E.2d at 126-27.
21. Id. at 712-13, 233 S.E.2d at 129. The court pointed out that the requirement of
confidentiality provides the following benefits: "(I) protects the reputatil)n of an individual
judge by shielding him from publicity involving frivolous complaints. (2) protects public
confidence in the judicial system by preventing disclosure of a complamt against a judge
until the Commission has determined the charge is well-founded, and (3) protects complainants and witnesses from possible recrimination by prohibiting disclosm.! of their identity
prior to a determination that the complaint is meritorious." Id. at 712,233 S.E.2d at 128-29.
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which would result from premature disclosure of the Commission's
proceedings. 22
2. The United States Supreme Court Decision
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. 23 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the six-member majority,24 disagreed with the Virginia
Supreme Court's conclusion that a clear and present danger to the administration of justice justified the curtailment of speech by criminal
sanctions. 25 He noted that some form of confidential judicial inquiry
and disciplinary procedure exists in virtually every state.26 The "substantial uniformity" of these plans suggested that "confidentiality is
perceived as tending to insure the ultimate effectiveness of the judicial
review commissions."27 But Landmark did not challenge the need for
confidentiality in proceedings to review the conduct and integrity of
judicial officers. Rather, it claimed only that confidentiality could not
be preserved by the imposition of criminal sanctions on third parties
not involved in the proceedings themselves, an approach that only one
other state besides Virginia had found necessary to adopt.28
In view of the foregoing, the Chief Justice formulated the issue in
Landmark as follows: "The narrow and limited question presented,
then, is whether the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment
22. !d. at 712-13,233 S.E.2d at 129.
23. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
24. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist
and Stevens. Justice Stewart filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Brennan
and Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
25. 435 U.S. at 845.
26. Id. at 834. The Chief Justice pointed out that 47 states, the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico have such judicial inquiry and disciplinary procedures. All of these jurisdictions except Puerto Rico require confidentiality in the early stages of the proceedings. A
list of the states and their relevant constitutional and statutory provisions was attached as an
appendix to the opinion. !d. app., at 846-48.
27. Id. at 835. Chief Justice Burger summarized the interests said to be served by the
requirement of confidentiality as follows: "First, confidentiality is thought to encourage the
filing of complaints and the willing participation of relevant witnesses by providing protection against possible retaliation or recrimination. Second, at least until the time when the
meritorious can be separated from the frivolous complaints, the confidentiality of the proceedings protects judges from the injury which might result from publication of unexamined
and unwarranted complaints. And finally, it is argued, confidence in the judiciary as an
institution is maintained by avoiding premature announcement of groundless claims of judicial misconduct or disability since it can be assumed that some frivolous complaints will be
made against judicial officers who rarely can satisfy all contending litigants." Id. (footnote
omitted). See note 2 supra. Confidentiality is also thought to facilitate the removal or
retirement of judges without a formal proceeding with its attendant publicity, and to permit
a judge to be made aware of valid complaints. 435 U.S. at 835-36.
28. !d. at 836-37.
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of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including the news
media, for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding
confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission."29 Before examining this issue in light of the facts of the case, the
Court considered Landmark's contention that recent decisions regarding the truthful and even untruthful reporting about public officials30
and the dissemination of accurate commercial information31 should be
dispositive of the question presented. Holding that the speech in question "lies near the core of the First Amendment,"32 the Court rejected
the need to rely on the more tangential First Amendment values implicated in the context of libel or commercial speech. As Chief Justice
Burger observed: "The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern."33
The operation of the Commission was deemed such a matter of
public interest, and Landmark's article of October 4 was found to have
provided accurate factual information about its proceedings. 34 In the
Court's view, this reporting "clearly served those interests in public
scrutiny and discussion of governmental affairs which the First Amendment was adopted to protect. "35
The Court responded to the Commonwealth's argument that the
First Amendment does not protect the publication of information
"which by Constitutional mandate is to be confidential."36 The state
had relied on Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 37 in support of this position. In Cox the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amend29. Id. at 837 (footnote omitted). In an accompanying footnote, the Court explained
that while the statute in question might have been construed by the Virgima Supreme Court
so as to apply only to participants to the proceedings and not to third parties, the broad
construction given the statute by the lower court precluded a narrow reading by the
Supreme Court since" 'it is not our function to construe a state statute contrary to the construction given it by the highest court of a State.''' Id. at 837 n.9 (quoting O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974».
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro; 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
32. 435 U.S. at 838 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 64-65 (1970».
33. 435 U.S. at 839. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). q. Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("With respect to judicial proceedings in particular,
the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the
beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.").
34. 435 U.S. at 839.
35. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964».
36. 435 U.S. at 840 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 17). VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10, provides, inter alia, that "[p]roceedings before the Commission shall be confidentiaL"
37. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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ments shielded a newspaper from liability for invasion of privacy based
on the accurate reporting of the name ofa deceased rape victim. 38 Crucial to the decision in Cox was the fact that the name of the victim had
been revealed in a public proceeding.39 Moreover, the Court in Cox
specifically reserved the question of the scope of First Amendment protection where, as in Landmark, public records are not involved.40 Because Cox did not answer the question presented, the Landmark Court
undertook an inquiry to determine whether Landmark's actions were
protected by the First Amendment.
The Court examined the interests which the Commonwealth
claimed were protected by the statute.41 The Court was willing to assume that confidentiality serves legitimate state interests, but nevertheless concluded that this did not justify the imposition of criminal
sanctions on third parties to the proceedings such as Landmark.42
Chief Justice Burger noted that the Commonwealth had provided no
factual basis to demonstrate the necessity for criminal proscriptions
and emphasized that most states had not adopted such an approach.43
Injury to official reputation does not constitute a sufficient justification
for punishing otherwise protected speech.44 Consequently, the reputation of the courts as an institution merits no greater protection.45 Support for these conclusions was found in Justice Black's observation in
Bridges v. Caltfornia:46
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from public criticism wrongly appraises the
character of American political opinion. . . . [A]n enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance
respect.47
Since the Commonwealth had not justified the burden its statutory
scheme placed on protected speech, the Supreme Court reversed
38. /d. at 495.
39. /d. at 496-97.
40. Id. at 497 n.27.
41. Criminal sanctions were said to be necessary to prevent the public discussion of
unfounded allegations of judicial misconduct and the premature disclosure of the details of
proceedings before the Commission. See 435 U.S. at 840. See also note 27 supra.
42. 435 U.S. at 841.
43. /d. & n.12.
44. /d. at 841-42 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964».
45. 435 U.S. at 842.
46. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
47. Id. at 270-71. See also id. at 291-92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Landmark's conviction.48
In the final section of the Landmark opinion, the Court criticized
the Virginia Supreme Court's reliance upon and mechanical application of the clear and present danger test.49 A legislatively determined
state interest was viewed as an insufficient basis for a judicial finding of
a clear and present danger. 50 In the words of Chief Justice Burger:
"Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when
First Amendment rights are at stake."51 The Court disapproved of the
Virginia court's attempt to distinguish Landmark from prior cases
which had rejected findings of clear and present danger arising from
out-of-court media commentaries. 52 If anything, the Court noted, the
threat to the administration of justice posed in those cases was more
direct and substantial than that presented by Landmark s disclosure.53
Referring to the availability of contempt powers to punish breaches of
confidentiality by commission members and staff, as well as to oaths of
secrecy sometimes required of commission members, staff and witnesses, the Court concluded that "much of the risk [to the administration of justice] can be eliminated through careful internal procedures to
protect the confidentiality of Commission proceedings.")4 Despite the
availability of alternative measures for protecting the state's interest in
confidentiality, the Court found that the "danger" embodied in
Landmark's publication " 'is precisely one of the types of activity envisioned by the Founders in presenting the First Amendment for
48. 435 U.S. at 842, 845-46.
49. Id. at 842-43: "Mr. Justice Holmes' test was never intended 'to e"'press a technical
legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases.' Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Properly applied, the test requires a court
to make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from
the particular utterance and then to balance the character of the evil, a$ well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression. The possibility that other measures will serve the State's interests should also be weighed."
50. Id. at 844. See also Justice Pofrs dissent from the Virginia Supr.:me Court's decision, 217 Va. 699, 713, 233 S.E.2d 120, 129 (1977) (Polf, J., dissenting) "Just as a court
cannot infer the existence of a clear and present danger from allegations m .ide in a contempt
citation and adopt that inference as a conclusion of law, Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962), a court cannot infer the existence of a clear and present danger from the mere enactment of a penal statute." Id.
51. 435 U.S. at 843. In support of the need for an independent judici.tl inquiry into the
existence of a clear and present danger, the Chief Justice quoted from Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 318-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See 435 U.S. at 843-44.
52. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra.
53. 435 U.S. at 845.
54. Id. (citing 435 U.S. at 841 n.12).
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ratification.' "55
Justice Stewart concurred in the Court's judgment but could not
agree that section 2.1-37.13 was unconstitutionaP6 In his view, "[t]here
could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State's interest in
the quality of its judiciary."57 Based on this paramount concern, Justice Stewart recognized the legitimate "derivative interest" in maintaining the confidentiality of Commission proceedings. 58 Thus, the state
could constitutionally punish any individual who breached this confidentiality.59 However, rather than attempting to enforce criminal sanctions against an individual, Virginia sought to punish a newspaper for
its publication of the information. This application of the statute to the
press was deemed unconstitutional: "If the constitutional protection of
a free press means anything, it means that government cannot take it
upon itself to decide what a newspaper may and may not publish.',60
3. Analysis
Analysis of the questions raised and resolved in Landmark can
best be accomplished by focusing on two aspects of the case. The first
section that follows will discuss the extent to which Landmark is consistent with the "clear and present danger" cases relied upon by the
Virginia Supreme Court. The second section will examine the utility of
applying the clear and present danger test in future media cases.
a.

Background of the Clear and Present .Danger Standard

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Bridges v.
Cal!lornia,61 Pennekamp v. F/orida,62 Craig v. H arney63 and Wood v.
55. Id. at 845 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962».
56. 435 U.S. at 848 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 849. Because Justice Stewart refused to join the majority opinion, his concurrence must be taken as an endorsement of the state's right to punish any nonmedia individual or entity who divulges information concerning Commission proceedings. The majority
declined to address the question of the possibility of imposing criminal sanctions on persons
who actually participated in the proceedings. See id. at 837 & n.9. Indeed, the Court even
suggested that such punishment would be constitutional. See id. at 841 n.12. But the majority did not limit its holding to the protection of the news media; any third person who was a
stranger to the proceedings is within the Court's decision. See id. at 837. Justice Stewart
apparently wrote separately to emphasize his belief that First Amendment protections for
the disclosure of confidential information should be extended only to members of the press.
60. Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
62. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
63. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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Georgia 64 constitute the "clear and present danger" cases upon which
the Virginia Supreme Court relied in affirming Landmark's conviction. 65 Each of these-cases involved a lower court's use of the common
law power of contempt to punish out-of-court statements concerning
pending cases or investigations. Such statements, in the view of the
courts, created a clear and present danger to the orderly administration
of justice.
Writing for the Court in Bridges, Justice Black reversed a decision
of the California Supreme Court66 which upheld a ruling that the Los
Angeles Times had been in contempt of court when it published an
editorial urging a judge to imprison two criminal defendants then on
trial. Justice Black began his analysis by noting that there had been no
legislative determination that such out-of-court commentary posed a
danger justifying punishment. 67 Thus, the decision by the California
Supreme Court did not come up for review "encased in the armor
wrought by prior legislative deliberation."68 Relying on language from
Cantwell v. Connecticut,69 Justice Black noted that had there been an
indication of legislative intent, such a " 'declaration of the State's policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as infringing constitutional limitations.' "70 In the absence of such a legislative
declaration, the Court in Bridges was reluctant to rely on the California
courts' determinations that the editorials at issue had either an "inherent" or "reasonable" tendency to interfere with the orderly administration of justice.71 Unfortunately, the Court failed to set forth with any
specificity precisely what type of speech would be punishable under a
clear and present danger analysis. Instead, Justice Black provided the
following summary: "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present
danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished."72
Five years later, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Penne64. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
65. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. at 700-13, 233 S.E.2d at
125,29.
66. Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939), Compare Times
Mirror v. Superior Court, IS Cal. 2d 99, 98 P.2d 1029 (1940).
67. 314 U.S. at 260.
68. Id. at 261.
69. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (absence of a state policy restricting street discussion of religious affairs weighed heavily in reversal of defendant's conviction).
70. 314 U.S. at 260 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 290. 307-08 (1940».
71. 314 U.S. at 272-73.
72. Id. at 263.
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kamp v. Florida,73 Justice Reed recognized the vagueness of the
Bridges standard and reiterated the Court's belief that clarity and definiteness would somehow emerge in subsequent cases. 74 The
Pennekamp decision did not fulfill this expectation, however, only adding to the Bridges standard the requirement of "a solidarity of evidence.'>75 The Pennekamp Court's major contribution to the clear and
present danger test was not this addition to the guidelines but rather the
instructions on how the required evidence is to be obtained. The
Pennekamp Court noted that it was "compelled to examine for [itself]
the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were
made to see whether or not they do carry a threat of clear and present
danger. . . ."76 The Virginia Supreme Court's failure to carry out this
investigative process was a major factor underlying the Supreme
Court's rejection of its analysis in Landmark. The Virginia court's reliance solely on the legislative determination was deemed insufficient,77
and Chief Justice Burger reiterated the importance of undertaking an
independent judicial investigation.78 He concluded by asserting that if
the Virginia court had undertaken such an inquiry it would have realized that Landmark's article did not present a clear and present danger
to the administration of justice?9
Applying the guidelines established in Bridges and Pennekamp to
the Court's decision in Landmark,80 it appears that the latter decision is
73. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
74. £d. at 334.
75. Id. at 347. The only other suggestion of a guideline for determining the existence of
a clear and present danger appears in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion: "It is the
focused attempt to influence a particular decision that may have a corroding effect on the
process of justice, and it is such comment that justifies the corrective process." Id. at 366
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Yet even this statement provides little guidance since the nature and extent of the "focused attempt" were not defined.
76. Id. at 335.
77. 435 U.S. at 844. The Court stated: "It was ... incumbent upon the Supreme Court
of Virginia to go behind the legislative determination and examine for itself 'the particular
utteranc[e] here in question and the circumstances of [its] publication to determine to what
extent the substantive evil of unfair administration of justice was a likely consequence, and
whether the degree of likelihood was sufficient to justify [subsequent] punishment.'" Id.
(quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941)).
78. 435 U.S. at 844: "A legislature appropriately inquires into and may declare the
reasons impelling legislative action but the judicial function commands analysis of whether
the specific conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute and if so whether the legislation is consonant with the Constitution."
79. Id. at 844-45. See note 90 infra.
80. Bridges and Pennekamp having established the basic, albeit vague, guidelines for
applying the clear and present danger test, the primary significance of the two subsequent
press cases, Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), and Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962), is their reaffirmation of the requirement of an independent judicial investigation of
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consistent with its predecessors insofar as it represents the continuation
of the Court's policy of reversing the use by lower courts of the contempt power to restrain out-of-court commentary by the media concerning pending proceedings or investigations. Where the Landmark
decision appears to break with precedent is in the Court's suggestion
that the clear and present danger test is not applicable to cases like
Landmark,8l a suggestion whose effect would be virtually to eliminate
the test from the active lexicon of constitutional adjudication.
b.
(1)

The Future of the Clear and Present .Danger Test
The Question of Relevancy

The Landmark decision significantly diminishes the usefulness of
the clear and present danger standard in contempt of court prosecutions of the news media. By questioning whether the test was relevant
to the situation presented in Landmark,82 the Court may have eliminated the last area in which it had been actively applied-the administration of justice cases. 83
The Court began its discussion of the applicability of the standard
by noting that the Virginia Supreme Court had relied on the test in
rejecting Landmark's constitutional challenge to its conyiction. 84 Disapproving this reliance, the Court criticized the use of the clear and
present danger test in Landmark on two grounds: it questioned the
relevancy of the test to the Landmark situation, and particularly rejected what it termed the "mechanical application" of the test by the
state court. 85 Although the Court did not set forth specific support for
its contention that the test was not relevant to the question presented in
the alleged threat to the administration of justice. The only additional guidelines these cases
provided were as follows: 1) The Court in Craig asserted that the danger "must not be
remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil." 331 U.S. at 376. Craig also indicated that publications which were merely in bad taste could not be considered dangerous.
Id. at 377. 2) In Wood, the Court overturned a contempt citation for critkizing the charging
of a grand jury and interfering with its investigation. Relying on the Eridges-Pennekamp
standard, the Court based its reversal on the failure of the lower court to adduce evidence
demonstrating an actual interference with justice, 370 U.S. at 386-88, .md the failure to
adhere to legislative limitations on the use of the contempt power. Id. at 385-86 & n.lO. In
making this latter ground an explicit basis for its decision, see id., the Court reaffirmed the
prior legislative deliberation doctrine of Bridges. See notes 67-68 and .lccompanying text
supra.
81. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra.
82. 435 U.S. at 842.
83. T. EMERSON, supra note 16, at 456.
84. 435 U.S. at 842.
85. Id. Quoting from Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), the Landmark Court noted that the test had never been intended to provide a
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Landmark, it substantiated this view by measuring the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth of Virginia against the requirements
established in Bridges and Pennekamp.86 The Supreme Court of Virginia had conceded that the record was devoid of actual facts demonstrating a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 87 It
nonetheless held that the legislative declaration that such a danger
would exist, coupled with the stipulated fact that Landmark published
the article, was sufficient to warrant the imposition of a criminal sanction. 88 The propriety of the Virginia court's reliance on this legislative
determination was emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court: "Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First
Amendment rights are at stake."89 In Chief Justice Burger's view, ifthe
Supreme Court of Virginia had looked behind the legislative declaration and examined the particular facts surrounding the speech at issue,
it would not have found any threat to the administration of justice sufficiently serious to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions. 90 Thus,
the absence of an adequate factual basis for Landmark's conviction
seems to have been one ground for the Court's view that the clear and
present danger test was inapplicable in that context. 91
A second basis for regarding this test as unnecessary to the disposition of Landmark is the Court's characterization of the speech at issue
as lying "near the core of the First Amendment."92 Citing as an example its ruling in Buckley v. Valeo,93 the Court concluded that the Commonwealth's asserted interests were insufficient to justify the
encroachment on freedom of speech and of the press that follow from
the imposition of criminal sanctions. 94 The Court's subsequent analyformula or technical legal doctrine for adjudicating free speech cases. 435 U.S. at 842. See
note 49 supra.
86. See notes 66-76 and accompanying text supra.
87. 217 Va. at 707, 233 S.E.2d at 126.
88. /d. at 708-09, 233 S.E.2d at 126-27.
89. 435 U.S. at 843. See note 51 supra.
90. 435 U.S. at 84445. The Court noted that the threat to the administration of justice
posed in Landmark was less direct and substantial than that claimed to arise in Bridges,
Pennekamp, Craig and Wood. It concluded that if the requirements of the clear and present
danger test could not be satisfied in those cases, they could not be met in Landmark. Id. at
845.
91. The decision in Landmark brings the Court closer to acceptance of the "full protection rule." As discussed by T. EMERSON, supra note 16, at 457: "Under that doctrine a
communication critical of the court could be punished or suppressed only if it amounted to
'action' rather than 'expression.''' The author suggests that threats of physical violence or
an employer's threats to employees would be examples of such "action."
92. 435 U.S. at 838.
93. 424 U.S. I (1976).
94. 435 U.S. at 838. In Bllckley, the Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality
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sis focused on the public interest in the operation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. Landmark's article was found to have
accurately reported on its proceedings, a function which promoted values central to the First Amendment.9s The Court relied on its prior
decisions which had underscored the amenability of judges and the judiciary to criticism voiced in the press. 96 The subsequent discussion of
the clear and present danger test was therefore a response to the Virginia Supreme Court's analysis rather than a basis for the decision in
Landmark.
(2) The Alternative Means Analysis

As noted earlier,97 the administration of justice cases constitute
one of the last areas in which the Court, prior to Landmark, had utilized the clear and present danger test. One factor the Court apparently considered in striking down the criminal conviction in Landmark
was that the Virginia statute, with its imposition of criminal sanctions,
was out of step with the laws of over forty states, none of which "found
it necessary to enforce confidentiality by use of criminal sanctions
against nonparticipants."98 The Court noted that these other states
only punish breaches of confidentiality by commission members and
staff, and that such breaches are punishable as civil contempt rather
than criminal violations. 99 The Court also noted that some states require witnesses as well as staff and commission members to take an
oath of secrecy. A violation of this requirement is similarly treated as
contempt. 100 While the Court did not consider these sister state approaches to ensuring confidentiality dispositive of the issue before it, 101
of the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Responding to
the argument that compelled disclosure of the identity of campaign contributors infringed
the right of associational privacy, the Court conceded that a "mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest" would be insufficient to justify such an encroachment upon
First Amendment values. The appropriate analysis, the Court held, involves strict scrutiny
of the asserted state interests to determine whether there is a "relevant correlation" or "substantial relation" between the governmental interest and the information to be disclosed.
424 U.S. at 64.
95. 435 U.S. at 839 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70
(1964)).
96. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941); id. at 289,
291-92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
97. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
98. 435 U.S. at 841 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 841 n.12.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 841.
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it seems reasonable to assume that the existence and widespread use of
non-criminal alternative means for protecting the asserted state interests was a significant factor in the Court's resolution of Landmark. 102
The widespread use of civil contempt sanctions and other non-criminal
approaches to ensuring confidentiality points to another reason for the
inapplicability of the clear and present danger test in situations such as
that presented in Landmark. Legislatures are now cognizant of the fact
that when the news media criticizes the functioning of the judiciary,
courts should hold such criticism fully protected by the First Amendment unless it goes so far as to amount to "action" instead of expression.103 Consequently, most state legislatures now protect the
confidentiality of their judicial review commission proceedings through
non-criminal sanctions aimed primarily at participants. 104 The effect of
this trend is to limit the use of the clear and present danger test to those
rare situations in which the speech at issue creates an imminent danger
of harm. 105
c.

The Publication of Legally Co'!ftdential I'!!ormation

One further aspect of the Landmark decision merits discussion in
this review, although it is not related to the clear and present danger
analysis previously discussed. The Commonwealth had argued in
Landmark that the First Amendment right of a free press to report on
and criticize judicial conduct did not extend to the publication of information " 'which by Constitutional mandate is to be confidential.' "106
The Commonwealth relied on the Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting
Cop. v. Cohn 107 to support this contention. In Cox the Court held that
102. The Court noted that its prior decisions had struck down the suppression of speech
claimed necessary by a state to protect the reputations of its judges or to maintain the institutional integrity ofits courts. Id. at 841-42 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 272-73 (1964); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941». These principles
were deemed controlling and dispositive of the criminal punishment issue in Landmark. 435
U.S. at 842.
103. See note 91 supra.
104. The Court did not indicate whether it would consider these non-criminal approaches constitutionally valid in a fact situation similar to that presented in Landmark.
The Court pointed out that the scope of other states' non-criminal sanctions is limited by
their application solely to participants to the proceedings, as opposed to the Virginia statute's broad prohibition against disclosure by "any person." 435 U.S. at 841 & n.12. Thus it
remains possible that a legislative enactment prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information by a non-participant (i.e., a newspaper) might be found unconstitutional by the
Court irrespective of the nature of the punishment imposed.
105. See note 91 supra.
106. 435 U.S. at 840 (citing Brief for Appellee at 17).
107. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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a civil action would not lie against a television station for invasion of
privacy based on the broadcast of the name of a deceased rape victim
obtained from public records.108 The Landmark Court rejected the
Commonwealth's reliance on Cox since that decision had explicitly reserved the broader question of "whether the publication of truthful information withheld by law from the public domain is similarly
privileged."109 The Court in Landmark also refused to deal fully with
the question left open in Cox. Noting its belief that Cox did not provide a dispositive answer to the question presented in Landmark, the
Court concluded: "We need not address all the implications of that
question here, but only whether in the circumstances of this case
Landmark's publication is protected by the First Amendment."11O
Since the Court proceeded to hold that the publication could not be
criminally punished, III it can be inferred that the Court answered the
Cox question in the affirmative. In the wake of Landmark, newspapers
would appear to be free to publish truthful information withheld from
the public domain, insofar as that information pertains to judicial review commission proceedings in which the newspaper is not a participant. A more general grant of privilege cannot fairly be inferred from
Landmark given the intent of the Court to limit their resolution of the
Cox question to the facts in Landmark.
B.

Searches of Newspaper OJlices: Zurcher v. Stanford Daily

In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,112 the Supreme Court addressed a
controversy regarding a different facet of the non-participant observer
role of the news media than was confronted in the Landmark I 13 case.
The issue in Zurcher was how the terms of the Fourth Amendment, 114
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, 115 should be
construed in the context of a third-party search 116 of a newspaper of108. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
109. 435 U.S. at 840 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 497 n.27). See
note 40 and accompanying text supra.
110. 435 U.S. at 840.
111. Id. at 841-42.
112. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
113. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), For a discussion
of Landmark, see notes 1-111 and accompanying text supra.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue. but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
115. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
116. The Supreme Court characterized a third-party search as "the recurring situation
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fice. The object of the search in Zurcher was evidence pertaining to
criminal activity which a member of the newspaper staff may have photographed and written about, but in which he did not participate. The
crucial question in the case was procedural: whether such evidence can
properly be obtained by means of a search warrant or whether its production must be compelled by service of a subpoena duces tecum.
A federal district court ruled that the First Amendment protects
newspapers from being subjected to searches pursuant to a warrant,
except where a clear showing could be made that upon service of a
subpoena the evidence sought would be removed from the jurisdiction
or destroyed, notwithstanding the issuance of a restraining order in
conjunction with the subpoena. 117 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed per curiam, adopting the opinion of the district
court. 118 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 119 and subsequently reversed the lower court decisions.
1. The Decision

The fact situation underlying the Zurcher litigation is uncomplicated. 120 On Friday, April 9, 1971, demonstrators then occupying the
administrative offices of the Stanford University Hospital engaged in a
violent altercation with nine police officers in a hallway of the occupied
building. The officers were part of a joint force comprised of officers
from the Santa Clara County Sheriffs and Palo Alto Police Departments, who had been called to the scene by the hospital director to oust
the demonstrators. The latter had barricaded the doors to both ends of
a hallway next to the administrative offices. After peaceful means
failed to persuade the demonstrators to leave, the police forced their
way in through the west end of the hallway. Simultaneously, the demonstrators, a~ed with sticks and clubs, burst through the east end of
the hallway, attacking and injuring the nine officers stationed there.
Since the police photographer and most other bystanders had congregated at the west end of the hall, few of the assailants were identified;
where state authorities have probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or other
evidence of crime is located on identified property but do not then have probable cause to
believe that the owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the crime that has
occurred or is occurring." 436 U.S. at 553.
117. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), cifid, 550 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
118. 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
119. 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
120. The summary of the facts of the case is taken from the Supreme Court opinion. 436
U.S. at 550-52.
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however, the officers did see someone photographing the fight from the
east end of the hall.
In a special edition published the following Sunday, the Sta'!!ord
Daily, the student newspaper of Stanford University, carried articles
and photographs concerning the hospital demonstration and the hallway incident. The photographs carried the byline of a Daily staff member and indicated that he had been present at the east end of the
hallway, giving rise to the inference that he might have photographed
the assault on the nine officers. Accordingly, on the following day the
Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office requested a warrant
from the municipal court authorizing an immediate search of the
Daily's offices for any evidence the newspaper may have obtained regarding the hospital fight. The warrant was issued based on the municipal court's findings of "just, probable and reasonable cause for
believing that: Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material
and relevant to the identity of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with a Deadly Weapon, will be
located [on the premises of the Daily].' "121 The affidavit supporting
the request for the search warrant did not link any Dai(I' staff members
with the unlawful activity.
Later that same day four policemen searched the Daily's offices,
accompanied by several Daily staff members. The officers inspected
photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks and wastepaper baskets; locked rooms and drawers were not searched. The search yielded
only those photographs which had already been published; no new evidence was discovered. Approximately one month later, the Daily and
members of its staff instituted a civil action in federal court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against all law enforcement agents responsible for the issuance and execution of the warrant. 122 The complaint alleged that the search of the Daily's offices under color of law
had denied the newspaper and its staff of rights guaranteed to them by
the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
The district court refused to issue an injunction but did grant the
121. 436 U.S. at 551 (quoting language from the search warrant, app. 31-32, issued Apr.
12, 1971, Santa Clara County Municipal Court).
122. The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), \\hich provides that,
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
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.Daily's request for declaratory relief. 123 Although acknowledging the
existence of probable cause to believe that relevant evidence regarding
the criminal activity would be found in the .Daily's office, the court
nonetheless held that under the circumstances a search warrant was a
constitutionally impermissible means of obtaining such evidence. 124
Rather, the use of a subpoena duces tecum, unless made impracticable
by the circumstances, was regarded by the district court as the appropriate procedure for third-party searches where the possessor of the evidence is not suspected of any crime. 125
First Amendment considerations played a significant role in the
district court decision. The defendants' contention that newspapers, reporters and photographers have no greater Fourth Amendment protections than other citizens was held to be without merit. 126 Judge
Peckham reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment is not superfluous.
Numerous cases have held that the First Amendment 'modifies' the
Fourth Amendment to the extent that extra protections may be required when First Amendment interests are involved."127 The court
examined the threats to freedom of the press said to arise more readily
from the use of a search warrant than from employing a subpoena: 1)
police officers executing such warrants would, owing to the generally
disorganized nature of newspaper offices, have the opportunity to rummage through drawers and cabinets, thus endangering confidential
materials and relationships; 128 2) unlike a subpoena duces tecum,
search warrants are issued and executed ex parte, which deprives the
newspaper and its staff of the protections afforded by "judicial control"; 129 and 3) police searches might also jeopardize the newspaper's
123. 353 F. Supp. at 136.
124. Id. at 127.
125. Id. The court noted that impracticability could be established by a showing that the
materials sought would be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction despite a restraining
order. Id. at 133.
126. Id. at 134.
127. Id. (emphasis in the original) (citing A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964) (seizure of allegedly obscene books); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961)
(seizure of allegedly obscene magazines); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (seizure
of organization's membership lists); Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon, 426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1960)
(seizure of allegedly obscene motion picture film), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
401 U.S. 990 (1971); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert.
None of
den;ed, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (seizure of allegedly obscene motion picture
these cases dealt specifically with warrantless searches of newspaper offices.
128. 353 F. Supp. at 134-35. Such incursions by law enforcement agencies were thought
to have the potential for chilling the exchange of information these confidential relationships
foster, ultimately affecting the ability of the press to gather news. Id.
129. Id. at 135. In support of the need for such 'judicial control" over searches of newspapers, the court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (majority opinion), 710 (pow-

film».
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credibility and create a risk of self-censorship. 130
In the view of the district court, a police search of a newspaper
office creates an "overwhelming threat" to the proper functioning of
the press, especially where less drastic means can be employed to secure the needed information. 131 The court therefore held that thirdparty searches of newspapers are constitutionally impermissible except
where there is a clear showing before a magistrate that the materials
sought will be destroyed or removed and that a restraining order would
be futile. 132 Since the defendants had not made such a showing, the
court declared the search of the Daily's offices to have been
unlawful. 133
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 134 Writing
for the majority,135 Justice White characterized the district court decision as placing such a severe burden on the state to justify the use of a
search warrant that "the effect of the rule is that fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime may be recovered from third parties only by
subpoena, not by search warrant." 136 The Court contrasted this
"sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment" by the district court
with the language of the Amendment and its subsequent interpretation
in the federal judicial system, concluding that there was no direct authority for the rule propounded by the lower court. 137 Justice White
ell, J., concurring). Branzburg involved a newspaper reporter subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury regarding the sources for one of his stories.
130. 353 F. Supp. at 135.
131. N.
132. Id. Judge Peckham underscored his concern for First Amendment values by adding: "To stop short of this standard would be to sneer at all the First Amendment has come
to represent in our society." Id.
133. Id. The court also dismissed defendants' contentions that the Duily and members of
its staff lacked standing to question the legality of the search and that this question was
moot. Id. at 135-36.
134. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
135. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice5 Blackmun, Powell
and Rehnquist. Two dissenting opinions were filed, one by Justice Ste\\art, who was joined
by Justice Marshall, and a second by Justice Stevens. Justice Powell \\fote a separate concurring opinion in which he addressed the issues raised in Justice Stewart's dissent. Justice
Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
136. 436 U.S. at 553.
137. Id. at 554: "It is an understatement to say that there is no direct authority in this or
any other federal court for the District Court's sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment." (footnote omitted).
The district court had focused upon the Fourth Amendment rights of third parties,
noting that few reported cases touched even generally upon the issue. 353 F. Supp. at 127.
The district court was unable to cite any cases dealing specifically with whether or when a
subpoena duces tecum should be used in lieu of a search warrant. Observing that the Fourth
Amendment rights of third parties had previously been considered only in the context of
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began his examination of the prior cases construing and applying the
Fourth Amendment by quoting from the Court's recent decision in
Fisher v. United States. 138 In Fisher the Framers' approach to personal
privacy was interpreted to mean that "when the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great,
the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search and
seize will issue."139 Justice White also referred to the Court's decision
in Camara v. Municipal Court. 140 In Camara the question of whether
or not an administrative search warrant should issue under the standard of probable cause was said to tum on a balancing of the governmental interest justifying the intrusion against the constitutional
standard of reasonableness. 141 Finally, Justice White observed that a
recent decision of the Court 142 established that search warrants are not
directed at persons but rather at "places" and "things," so that a warrant need not even name the person from whom the property will be
seized. 143
Based on this analysis of Fourth Amendment precedent, the Court
standing to challenge the legality of a search, see, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969), the district court went on to examine state court cases dealing with what it believed to be an analogous situation to that presented in the instant case-the rights of third
parties in the face ofa warrantless seizure of property by the police. See Owens v. Way, 141
Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914); Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895);
Commodity Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923). In Commodity Mfg., the
New York Supreme Court came closest to anticipating the district court's position: "No case
has been cited where the court has gone so far as to say that property, not an instrument of a
crime, but only evidence of its commission, and which was the property of someone besides
the defendant, could be seized either under a search warrant or as an incident of an arrest of
defendant.
"I can well believe that property used in the commission of a crime, even though belonging to a third party, might properly be seized, and also that property not used in the
commission of the crime, but containing evidence of the commission of the crime, might
properly be seized, where it is the property of the accused; but to sanction the seizure 0/ the
property 0/innocent persons, or persons not accused, not used in the commission 0/the crime,
but merely because they contained evidence 0/the crime, would open the door to grave abuses 0/
invasion o/property rights." 198 N.Y.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
Justice White rejected as inapposite the district court's reliance upon these cases, as well
as its reliance on Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971) (a showing ofprobable cause to believe that a subpoena would be an impracticable alternative is required before
a court can issue a warrant for the arrest of a material witness). Zurcher v. Stanford Dailey,
436 U.S. at 554 n.5. For a discussion ·of the lower court's analysis of the applicability of
Bacon, see notes 206-10 and accompanying text infra.
138. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
139. Id. at 400, quoted in 436 U.S. at 554.
140. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
141. Id. at 534-35.
142. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
143. See id. at 155 n.15.
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concluded that the state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws and in
recovering evidence of violations ofthose laws is the same regardless of
the degree of culpability attributable to the person occupying the premises to be searched or in possession of the evidence to be seized. l44 The
Court thus rejected the premise underlying the district court holding,
which Justice White found to be "that State entitlement to a search
warrant depends on the culpability of the owner or possessor of the
place to be searched and on the State's right to arrest him."145 In support of this rejection of the lower court's position, the Court cited both
Camara and See v. City of Seattle 146 for the proposition that the state
need not rely on an individual's culpability as a prerequisite to the issuance of a search warrant. Camara and See were challenges to convictions for refusal to permit warrantless searches of commercial
property.147 The search in each instance was to have been conducted
by representatives of municipal administrative agencies (housing and
fire department inspectors), and was intended to ensure compliance
with local housing and fire ordinances. 148 Justice White. writing for the
majority in both Camara and See,149refused to follow the Court's earlier decision in Frank v. Maryland150 and held that in civil as well as
criminal cases, the Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be
issued before officials enter a private citizen's home or business premises.l5l Since the culpability of the individual property holders in
Camara and See was deemed irrelevant to the state's right to conduct
searches of their property, the Zurcher Court reasoned that culpability
on the part of the Daily or its staff need not be a consideration in the
case before it. 152 Consequently, the Court concluded that, "[t]he criti144. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 555.
145. Id.
146. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
147. Appellant in Camara had been charged with violating San Francisco Housing Code
§ 507 and sought a writ of prohibition against his prosecution in state court. Appellant in
See was convicted of violating the City of Seattle Fire Code § 8.01.150. These statutes made
criminal the refusal to permit an inspection by the housing and fire authorities, respectively.
148. The endorsement of these warrantless searches by the lower courts in each case was
based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959). The Court in Frank had ruled that a search warrant was not a necessary prerequisite
to an entry into a citizen's home to investigate sanitary conditions pursu.mt to a local health
ordinance.
149. Justice White was joined in each case by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black,
Douglas, Brennan and Fortas. A dissenting opinion covering both cases was filed by Justice
Clark, who was joined by Justices Stewart and Harlan.
150. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See note 148 supra.
151. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 534; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 546.
152. 436 U.S. at 555-56. The validity of this reading of Camara is questionable in light
of the facts underlying that case. The Court's opinion in Camara reveals that appellant
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cal element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property
is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that
the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located on the
property to which entry is sought."153 In support of this conclusion,
Justice White analyzed a prior case l54 which had challenged the right
of police officers to search a car and seize contraband therefrom when
the occupants were not subject to arrest. The Court there rejected the
claim that the right of police to search was dependent on the right to
arrest. 155 Justice White combined this rule with more recent interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, as reflected in Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,156 and found that "it is untenable to conclude that property may not be searched unless its occupant is reasonably suspected of crime and is subject to arrest."157 In the Zurcher
Court's opinion, the Fourth Amendment had established the proper
balance between privacy interests and public need, and the interpretation of that Amendment postulated by the district court was therefore
unnecessary and burdensome. 158
In the next section of the majority opinion, the Court examined
the reasons advanced by the district court in support of its decision.
Justice White first questioned whether the lack of culpability on the
part of the property owner requires the use of a subpoena rather than a
search warrant. He noted that the .Daily and its staff had conceded that
if a third party knows that there is contraband on his premises, he is
then sufficiently culpable to justify the issuance of a search warrant. 159
And once an innocent third party is apprised of the existence of such
evidence on his property, there is no reason why he should then be
Camara was suspected of using the rear portion of his leasehold as a personal residence in
violation of the building's occupancy permit. See 387 U.S. at 526. It was with knowledge of
this possible violation that the housing inspector confronted appellant and requested permission to inspect the premises. Upon appellant's subsequent refusals to permit entry, he was
arrested for violating the municipal housing code. See note 147 supra. It appears, therefore,
that his possible culpability was a factor motivating the request to search the premises. See
387 U.S. at 526-27.
153. 436 U.S. at 556 (footnote omitted).
154. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
ISS. Id. at 158-59.
156. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 n.l (1965).
157. 436 U.S. at 559. See United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 536 F.2d 699, 703
(6th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied sub nom. Wingate v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
158. 436 U.S. at 559. The Court therefore held that, "the courts may not, in the name of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, forbid the States from issuing warrants to search for
evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not then
reasonably suspected of criminal involvement." Id. at 560.
159. Id.
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allowed to object to the search, withhold the evidence and insist upon
service of a subpoena duces tecum. 160
The Court also considered the potential impact of a subpoena requirement on the efficiency and success of law enforcement efforts.
The Court posited two difficulties such a requirement would bring
about and characterized them as creating "[serious] hazards to criminal
investigation." 161 The first of these is that the seemingly innocent third
party might not actually be blameless and may in fact be connected
with or sympathetic to those who are culpable. Arguably such an individual could not be relied upon to retain evidence that might implicate
or otherwise harm his friends. Secondly, the Court voiced concern that
any close relationship between the third party and those suspected of
criminal acts would result in the "real culprits [having] access to the
property ... [which] could easily result in the disappearance of the
evidence, whatever the good faith of the third party."162 In view of
these potential impediments to the efforts of law enforcement agencies,
the Court concluded that the use of search warrants is necessary to secure and preserve valuable evidence. 163
The final section of the majority opinion addressed the question of
whether and to what extent First Amendment considerations should
modify the application of the Fourth Amendment when the subject of
the search is a newspaper office. Justice White began by reciting the
threats to the due functioning of the press claimed by the .Daily to arise
from such searches: I) physical disruption resulting in publication delays; 2) loss of confidential sources; 3) deterrence of the recording and
preserv~tion of information; 4) chilling of the processing and dissemination of news; and 5) resort to self-censorship on the part of the
press. 164 After acknowledging that the struggle which gave birth to the
Fourth Amendment was largely one" 'between the Crown and the
press,' "165 Justice White briefly reviewed the judicial history of the tension" between the First and Fourth Amendments. He referred to prior
160. Id. This assertion by the Court seems to ignore the possibility that the innocent
third party may have a valid objection to the search on the ground that it is an unnecessary
and unreasonable invasion of privacy.
161. Id. at 561.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 563. For an analysis of this aspect of the Court's opinion, see notes 232-35
and accompanying text infra.
164. 436 U.S. at 563-64.
165. £d. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965). The Court also
noted that "[w]here the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude.''' 436 U.S. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. at 485).
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decisions of the Court which had invalidated as too broad a warrant
authorizing the search of a private home for materials relating to the
Communist Party,166 and which rejected as unconstitutional searches
pursuant to a warrant where the required showing of probable cause
was not made before a neutral and disinterested magistrate. 167 But in
contrast to the district court's view that these First Amendment considerations require the use of a subpoena rather than a search warrant, 168
the Court concluded:
[T]he prior cases do no more than insist that the courts apply the
warrant requirements with particular exactitude when First
Amendment interests would be endangered by the search. As we
see it, no more than this is required where the warrant requested
is for the seizure of criminal evidence reasonably believed to be
on the premises occupied by a newspaper. 169
Having articulated this standard for the issuance of warrants authorizing searches of newspaper offices, the Court examined the specific
harms cited by the district court in support of its rule requiring the use
of subpoenas. Justice White first stated his confidence in the ability of
local magistrates to guard against searches of the type and scope that
would actually interfere with the timely publication of a newspaper. 170
He further emphasized that if the requirement of reasonableness and
specificity were properly applied to the issuance of search warrants,
there would be no opportunity for police to rummage at large through
newspaper offices; a search would therefore not inhibit editorial or publication decisions. 171 Finally, citing Branzburg v. Hayes,172Justice
White underscored the Court's doubts that confidential sources would
166. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). The search warrant issued in Stanford was
held to be the functional equivalent of a general warrant, the use of which it was the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment to forbid. fd. at 480. Cf. note 165 supra (terms of the Fourth
Amendment must be applied with "scrupulous exactitude" when First Amendment values
are at stake).
167. See, e.g., Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (obscene films);
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961) (obscene publications). The search
warrants in these cases were held defective because their issuance was based solely on the
conclusory allegations of police officers, without any independent inquiry by the magistrates.
See 392 U.S. at 637; 367 U.S. at 732.
168. See notes 123-30 and accompanying text sup.·a.
169. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 565.
170. N. at 566.
171. fd. See also id. at 565: "Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant-probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, and overall reasonableness-should afford sufficient protection against the harms
that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices."
l'Z2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzhurg held that the First Amendment does not afford a
newspaper reporter a constitutional privilege against testifying before a grand jury regarding
criminal activity he observed while performing his newsgathering function. Claims that
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disappear or that the press would engage in self-censorship if searches
of newspaper offices could be authorized by the issuance of warrants.
Whatever marginal effect such searches might have on newsgathering,
he noted, "does not make a constitutional difference in our
judgment." 173
The majority opinion concluded by pointing out that since the
date of the search which gave rise to the instant action. there had been
very few third-party searches of newspaper offices. 174 From this the
Court inferred that law enforcement agencies were not abusing their
power under the Fourth Amendment. 175 Any such abuses could be
dealt with as they arose, an unlikely occurrence in the Court's view
given the power of the press. 176 The Court also rejected the Daily's
claim that it should have been afforded an opportunity to litigate the
state's right to obtain the materials sought before they were seized. 177
A subpoena requirement was not regarded as providing the press any
greater protection than permitting searches pursuant to a warrant, since
a showing of relevancy sufficient to support a finding of probable cause
would, in the Court's view, also justify the issuance of a subpoena. 178
The Court did leave open the possibility of legislative or executive action "to establish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses
forced disclosure by newspersons of confidential information or sources relating to criminal
activity would greatly damage their effectiveness were rejected by the court. Id. at 693-99.
173. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 566.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.: "The press is not only an important, critical, and valuable asset to society, but it
is not easily intimidated. . . ."
177. Id. The majority opinion stated that "presumptively protected materials are not
necessarily immune from seizure under warrant for use at a criminal tn.ll." Id. at 567. The
Court found that most such seizures would not impose an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Id. (citing Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)).
178. 436 U.S. at 567. It should be noted, however, that with a warrant, the determination
as to the existence of probable cause to search is made in an ex parle proceeding, whereas if
a subpoena duces tecum is issued, the person or entity at whom it is directed will have an
opportunity to litigate the issue of the state's entitlement to the materi.ll before it is seized.
Thus, the opportunity to contest allegations of such entitlement may result in the quashing
of the subpoena and the consequent preservation of the confidentiality of the material. In
contrast, even if the validity of a search warrant can be successfully challenged, such a ruling
can only be obtained after the material has been seized, when the hanns arising from its
disclosure will have already occurred. See id. at 575-76 (Stewart, J., jomed by Marshall, J.
dissenting). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
In addition, the Court noted that certain privileges against comply mg with a subpoena,
such as those based on the Fifth Amendment or a state shield law, "are largely irrelevant to
determining the legality of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment." 436 U.S. at
567. Utilization of the warrant procedure therefore permits the circumvention of important
statutory and constitutional rights.
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of the search warrant procedure."179
In addition to reiterating the contentions advanced and relied
upon by the district court and adopted by the court of appeals,180 Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion made two significant observations.
Addressing the specific facts of the case, he pointed out that no showing
had been made by the police that there was an existing emergency situation at the time the warrant was issued, nor was the evidence sought
contraband or any other illegal instrumentality.181 Moreover, there
was no indication at the time the warrant was obtained that the Daily
would not comply with a subpoena. 182 Given this situation, Justice
Stewart argued that the police should have been required to establish
the impracticability of a subpoena bifore the magistrate authorized the
intrusion resulting from a search pursuant to a warrant. 183 The second
importan~ observation is Justice Stewart's contention that the First
Amendment's specific guarantee of freedom of the press compels the
conclusion that there is a significant difference between a search of a
newspaper office and that of any other type of premises. 184 He found
that the explicit constitutional protection for a free press justifies the
rule prohibiting searches of newspaper offices pursuant to a warrant
fashioned by the lower court. 185
A separate dissent was filed by Justice Stevens,186wherein he argued that the Court had erred in its application of the doctrine of War179. Id.
Id. at 570-74 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 575 & n.9.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576. In addition to joining the majority opinion, Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he challenged this aspect of Justice Stewart's dissent. Justice Powell pointed out that the Fourth Amendment was largely a response to the struggle
between the Crown and the press. 436 U.S. at 569 (powell, J., concurring). Given this history, Justice Powell stated that if the Framers had wished to accord the press special protection against searches otherwise authorized by the Fourth Amendment, they would have
formulated that Amendment explicitly to reflect that desire. Id. As Justice Stevens pointed
out in his dissenting opinion, however, searches of the type carried out in the .Daily's offices-those for documentary evidence-were not permitted until the Court's decision in
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 436 U.S. at 577-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
notes 187-89 and accompanying text infra. In Justice Powell's view, First Amendment values can adequately be vindicated by a magistrate's consideration of the rights of the free
press in connection with his determination of the reasonableness of the requested warrant.
436 U.S. at 570 & n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 576 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.). Justice Stewart endorsed
the district court decision only insofar as it granted special protection to newspapers. He
agreed with the majority that the Fourth Amendment does not generally forbid third-party
searches. Id. at 571 n.1.
186. Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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den v. Hayden. 187 The Court in Hayden extended the permissible scope
of searches to include the seizure of "mere evidence," generally defined
as documentary materials, in addition to that of the traditional objects
of a search: contrabarid, weapons and plunder. 188 Justice Stevens
noted that the pre-Hayden limitation on the permissible objects of a
search had had the effect of restricting the category of persons who
could properly be subjected to a search. 189 By permitting the seizure of
documentary evidence of crime, the Hayden decision greatly expanded
the number of persons whose privacy interests could be infringed by
such searches. Where the object of the search is contraband or the
fruits of crime, Justice Stevens found it reasonable to infer that the possessor is involved in criminal activity and that if given prior notice of
the search will dispose of the evidence. 19o In such cases a showing of
probable cause to believe that the individual is in fact in possession of
such objects justifies the invasion of privacy. 191 But where mere documentary evidence, such as that sought from the Sta'!fi-,rd .Daily, is involved, the custodian is much less likely to be guilty of criminal
wrongdoing and is more likely to honor a subpoena or informal request
to produce the material. 192 In such cases, Justice Stevens contended
that the probable cause standard can only be satisfied by a showing that
the subject of the search is involved in criminal activity or, if given
notice, will conceal or destroy the evidence. 193 Since no such showing
was made in the warrant application in Zurcher, Justice Stevens would
have held that the search of the .Daily offices was unreasonable and
therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. 194
2. Analysis

In order better to analyze the Court's decision in Zurcher, consideration of the case will be trisected. The first section will examine the
validity of the Court's holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
grant special protection to non-culpable third-party possessors of evidence sought by law enforcement agencies. The second section will
evaluate the necessity of using search warrants rather than subpoenas.
The third section will scrutinize the possible harm to the press that may
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Id. at 300-10.
436 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
N. at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 582-83.
Id. at 583.
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arise in the wake of Zurcher. The potential for legislative or executive
action to bolster the First Amendment guarantees potentially
threatened by the decision will also be discussed.
Before embarking on this specific analysis, however, it is important
to make one general observation regarding the contrast between the
approach taken by a majority of the Supreme Court in Zurcher and
that adopted by the district court and echoed by several justices who
dissented from the Court's decision. The crucial difference is that a
majority of the Supreme Court treated Zurcher essentially as a case
posing issues relating to the construction and application of the Fourth
Amendment. Consequently, the First Amendment issues were given
secondary importance by the Court. In contrast, the district court and
several dissenters on the Supreme Court focused directly on the First
Amendment implications of a search of a newspaper office. The
Zurcher majority first inquired whether or not the state had a valid
interest in and probable cause to conduct the search. Once that was
established, the Court required only that the warrant requirements be
applied with "scrupulous exactitude" when the premises to be searched
are a newspaper office. 195 Conversely, the district court and Justices
Stewart and Marshall looked first to the Stanford .Daily's rights under
the First Amendment and then sought to weigh those rights against the
state's interest in obtaining the materials. Finding that the state had
failed to show that the evidence sought could not be obtained in a less
intrusive manner than by a search pursuant to a warrant, the district
court and these dissenters urged that an appropriate balancing of interests could best be struck by limiting the use of search warrants against
newspapers to those instances where a subpoena duces tecum would be
impracticable. 196
a.

The Court's Interpretation

0/ the Fourth Amendment

The Supreme Court based its rejection of the district court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment on a number of grounds, each of
which merits examination. The first was that nothing in the language
of the Fourth Amendment precludes the issuance of third-party search
warrants. The Court rejected as inapposite the authorities relied upon
by the district court 197 and founded its own view on language in United
States v. Kahn 198 which suggested that search warrants are not directed
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 564 (majority opinion). See text accompanying note 169 supra.
436 U.S. at 575 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 554. See note 137 and accompanying text supra.
415 U.S. 143 (1974).
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at persons but rather at "places" and "thingS."199 The inference the
Court appeared to draw from Kahn was that the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment are satisfied, even where the person or persons at
whom the search is directed are not specified, when probable cause for
the search is demonstrated.2°O Although the Court's reliance on Kahn
may not have been well founded,201 it is the summary rejection of the
authorities cited by the district court that requires closer examination.
The Court's rejection of the four state cases cited in the district
court opinion202 is understandable in light of its ruling in Warden v.
Hayden203 that "mere evidence" can properly be the object of a
search.204 Since the cases relied upon by the lower court were preHayden decisions which did not address the specific question of
whether the issuance of a subpoena is a preferable alternative to the use
of a search warrant, they were properly held inapposite by the Supreme
Court. The same cannot be said for the Court's rejection of the district
court's argument by analogy to Bacon v. United States. 205 In Bacon the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the issuance of a warrant for the
arrest of a material witness invalid for failure to establish probable
cause to believe that securing the witness's presence by means of subpoena would be impracticapo6 The district court in Zurcher accepted
the Daily's argument that "if one not suspected of a crime cannot be
arrested unless there is a showing that subpoena is impracticable, one
not suspected of a crime cannot be searched unless there is a showing
199. Id. at 155 n.15.
200. 436 U.S. at 555.
201. A careful reading of the cited footnote in Kahn makes the Court's reliance on it
questionable. Kahn dealt with the question of whether the wiretapped conversations of a
person not named in the application seeking authorization for the wiretap could subsequently be used as evidence to prosecute the subject of the tap. But the b.lsis for the decision
in Kahn was the Court's construction of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976); it did not rest upon constitutional
grounds. See 415 U.S. at 150, 152-55. The footnote cited by the Court in Zurcher was
therefore merely dicta. Further, the Kahn Court stated in the same footnote that "even a
warrant failing to name the owner of the premises at which a search is dIrected, while not the
best practice, has been held to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 155 n.15
(emphasis added). It thus appears that while search warrants which do not specify the person from whom the material is to be seized are permissible, the Court \0 Kahn did attach
some importance to naming the party whose premises are to be searched, an emphasis not
reflected in the Zurcher Court's reference to Kahn.
202. Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914); Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich.
567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895); People v. Carver, 172 Misc. 820, 16 N.Y.S.2d 268 (County Ct.
1939); Commodity Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
203. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
204. Id. at 301-02.
205. 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
206. Id. at 943.
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that a subpoena duces tecum is impracticable."207 In response to the
argument that Bacon dealt only with the issue of permissible grounds
for an arrest and was not a search and seizure case, the district court
replied: "But historically the right against unlawful seizures has if anything been more protected, not less protected, than the right against
unlawful arrests."208 The argument by analogy to Bacon was deem~d
strong enough by the district court, and subsequently by the court of
appeals, to compel the conclusion that no search warrant can issue
against a third party unless the state shows that resort to a subpoena is
impracticapo9 Given this heavy reliance on Bacon, it would appear
that the case merited greater attention from the Supreme Court than its
summary treatment in a footnote.2 10
The second ground relied upon by the Supreme Court in reversing
the district court decision was that the culpability of the third-party
property holder is immaterial to the state's interest in enforcing its
criminal law and recovering evidence of crime.2 l l The Court bolstered
this contention by reference to Camara v. Municipal CourP12 and qee v.
City of Seattle. 213 The applicability of Camara and See in the factual
context of Zurcher is questionable for several reasons. First, at least
insofar as Camara is concerned, it is not at all clear that the culpability
of the property holder was not a factor in the Court's decision. 214 Secondly, neither of these cases arose initially out of situations involving
the issuance of search warrants. The common issue in Camara and See
was whether city health and fire inspectors could enter private premises
without judicial authorization for the purpose of conducting inspections to determine compliance with municipal ordinances. Petitioners
207. 353 F. Supp. at 129 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted).
208. Id. at 130 (emphasis in the original) (citing Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A NoMan's Land in Criminal Law, 49 CAL. L. REV. 474 (1961); Orfield, Warrant of Arrest in
Summons upon Complaint in Federal Criminal Procedure, 27 U. CIN. L. REV. I (1958». Defendants had also attempted to distinguish Bacon on the ground that it was based on 18
U.S.C. § 3149 (1976) and Rule 46(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than
the Fourth Amendment. See 353 F. Supp. at 129. The district court ruled, however, that the
procedures set out in the Federal Rules are mandated by the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480
(1958».
209. 353 F. Supp. at 130.
210. Justice White rejected the applicability of Bacon because "that case dealt with arrest
of a material witness and is unpersuasive with respect to the search for criminal evidence."
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 554 n.5.
211. Id. at 555.
212. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
213. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
214. See note 152 supra.
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in both cases insisted that the inspectors obtain search warrants before
they would grant them permission to enter. The Supreme Court subsequently vindicated their claims, holding that a search warrant is required for such inspections.
Since search warrants were required in Camara and See regardless
of the culpability of the property-holders there, the Zurcher Court
seemed to infer that the same rule should hold true in the case before it.
The difficulty with this analysis is that in Camara and See there existed
no less burdensome alternative to the use of a search warrant, while
there was such an alternative in Zurcher. The only viable method for
inspecting a personal residence or business premises is by a search.
The same is not true in situations such as that presented in Zurcher,
where the magistrate could have issued a subpoena for the desired
materials and thereby accomplished their acquisition. In view of the
Court's apparent unwillingness to consider the district court's analysis
based on its analogy to Bacon,21S it seems inconsistent for the Court to
have relied on such distinguishable cases as Camara and See.
An additional problem with the majority's discussion of the culpability question is its failure to squarely address two arguments made by
the lower court. The district court stated that "as a historical matter the
notion of search warrants has involved only those suspected of a
crime."216 It was perhaps in response to this obsen'ation that the
Supreme Court presented its analysis of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to show that considerations relating to searches
and seizures are separate and distinct from arrest procedures. 217 If so,
the Court missed the thrust of the district court's argument. The lower
court only felt that in light of the historical limitation on the use of
search warrants to those suspected of crime, a less burdensome alternative that could achieve the same results should be utilized to obtain
evidence from innocent third parties.218
The district court also noted that the practice of issuing search
215. See notes 205-10 and accompanying text supra.
216. 353 F. Supp. at 131. In support of this contention, the district C,)urt cited Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959); United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.
1930) (opinion of Learned Hand, J.); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in
Criminal Law, 49 CAL. L. REV. 474, 475-77 (1961).
217. See 436 U.S. at 558-59 (citing ALI, A MODEL CODE OF RE-ARR \lGNMENT PROCEDURE, COMMENTARY 491 (Proposed Off. Draft 1975». See also United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 536 F.2d 699, 703 (1976), cerl. denied sub nom. Wingate v. United States,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977). See text accompanying note 157 supra.
218. q. 436 U.S. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (where the obje.::t of a search is an
innocent third party, probable cause can only be established by a showing that ifnotice were
given, he would conceal or destroy the evidence sought).
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warrants without regard to the culpability of the person at whom the
search is directed results in the inequitable treatment of innocent third
parties. Whereas the exclusionary rule is available to vindicate the
rights of criminal defendants, "[a] third-party ... does not have the
protection or deterrent of the exclusionary rule, for by definition he is
not about to be tried for a crime."219 Consequently, the district court
held that in the case of an innocent third party, "an additional safeguard is necessary to assure that his Fourth Amendment rights are not
trampled. That protection is the obligation oflaw enforcement to use a
subpoena duces tecum unless it is shown, through sworn affidavits, that
it is impractical to do SO."220
Justice White was unpersuaded as to the necessity of this additional requirement. He asserted that the existing provisions and interpretations of the Fourth Amendment constitute an adequate balancing
of the individual's right of privacy against the public need, regardless
of whether a subpoena duces tecum is a less intrusive alternative.221
The majority went further in rejecting the need for additional Fourth
Amendment protections, relying on the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Alderman v. United States222 to conclude that "the interest in
deterring illegal third-party searches does not justify a rule such as that
adopted by the District Court."223 The majority also stated that "it
would be placing the cart before the horse to prohibit searches otherwise conforming to the Fourth Amendment because of a perception
that the deterrence provided by the existing rules of standing is insufficient to discourage illegal searches."224 Finally, the district court was
chastised for having overlooked the-California Supreme Court's previ219. 353 F. Supp. at 132.
220. Id. (footnote omitted).
221. 436 U.S. at 559.
222. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). In Alderman, Justice White, writing for a majority of the
Court, noted that "[t]he established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth
Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by
the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging
evidence." Id. at 171-72. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963);
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942). He went on to state that "[w]e adhere
to . . . the general rule that Fourth Amendment right; are personal rights which, like some
other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." 394 U.S. at 174. See Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260-61
(1960).
223. 436 U.S. at 562 n.9. The Court in Alderman had ruled that the additional deterrent
effect of extending the exclusionary rule did not 'Justify further encroachment upon the
public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted
on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." 394 U.S. at 175.
224. 436 U.S. at 562-63 n.9 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967».
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ous ruling in Kaplan v. Superior CourP25 that the legality of a search
and seizure can be challenged by anyone against whom the evidence
obtained is used, regardless of whether his own Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. In this vein, however, the Zurcher Court failed to
recognize the apparent inconsistency between its views and the reasoning underlying Kaplan. In extending the applicability of the exclusionary rule beyond the parameters delineated in Alderman. the California
Supreme Court in Kaplan reaffirmed its position that" 'if law enforcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by obtaining
evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its deterrent effect is
to that extent nullified. Moreover, such a limitation virtually invites
law enforcement officers to violate the rights of third parties. . . .' "226
But it was left unclear by the Supreme Court in Zurcher how California law would provide any protection for the rights of the Stanford
Daily and its staff in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
brought in federal court under a federal statute.227 If .Kaplan grants the
Daily no substantive rights, its very inapplicability together with its rationale would seem to support the district court's perception that additional Fourth Amendment protections are required for third-party
searches. Thus, the Zurcher majority's reference to Aaplan does not
resolve the question of the need for additional protections, but rather
serves to call attention to the differing views of the United States and
California Supreme Courts.
b.

The State's Interest-The Necessity of Search Warrallts

One basis for the district court's holding was its belief that requiring a subpoena for most third-party searches would not substantially
impede criminal investigations. A majority of the Supreme Court
found, however, that the state's interest in efficient and successful law
enforcement would be seriously dis served if the use of search warrants
was limited as provided under the lower court opinion. Two hypothetical examples of this undermining influence were advanced in the body
of the majority opinion, with a third possibility discussed in a footnote. 228 Because search warrants are frequently employed early in an
investigation, the Court suggested that the "seemingly blameless" third
party who possesses the evidence may not tum out to be innocent after
225. 6 Cal. 3d 150,491 P.2d I, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
226. 6 Cal. at 157,491 P.2d at 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (quoting Peopl.:: v. Martin, 45 Cal.
2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 860 (1955».
227. The action in Zurcher was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note
122 supra. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
228. 436 U.S. at 561 & n.8.
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aU-and even if not directly culpable might still not be relied upon to
surrender evidence which implicates his friends.2 29 As a corollary to
this possibility, Justice White stated that "it is likely that the real culprits will have access to the property, and the delay involved in employing the subpoena duces tecum . . . could easily result in the
disappearance of the evidence."23o Finally, it was suggested in a footnote that the use of a subpoena would allow the recipient to interpose a
Fifth Amendment challenge to the request, and that the resultant litigation could "seriously impede criminal investigations."231
The Court's concern regarding the first two problems is unsupported either by authority or specific examples indicating the extent to
which such problems have occurred in the past. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, prior to the change brought about
by the Court's decision in Warden v. Hayden,232 documentary evidence
was routinely obtained by subpoena. 233 This procedure assumed that
the person in possession of the evidence would honor the subpoena,
and the Zurcher majority did not question its effectiveness. Moreover,
the Court's assertion that problems of preserving evidence would occur
and thereby hamper law enforcement efforts is not supported by the
facts in Zurcher. As the district court pointed out, "[t]here was no hint
whatsoever that the sought after materials would be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction."234 Although the Daily apparently had
announced a policy of destroying any photographs that might implicate
the protesters,235 there is no evidence that such a destruction took place
and the majority did not cite this policy in support of its holding. Even
if it could be assumed that the Daily would not have preserved evidence of the assault on the police, it is unlikely that the same problem
would arise in other factual contexts. It is difficult to believe, for example, that when a member of a newspaper staff photographs a bank robbery, he will return the incriminating photographs to the bank robbers.
And it can be assumed that third parties will generally not act so as to
impede criminal investigations. Yet this is what the unqualified language in Zurcher appears to suggest.
The third impediment to law enforcement efforts said to arise from
the enforced use of the subpoena procedure-that challenges to the va229.
230.
231.
232.
23,3.
234.
235.

Id. at 561.
£d.
£d. at 561-62 n.8.

387
436
353
436

U.S. 294 (1967). See notes 187-89 and accompanying text supra.
U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
F. Supp. at 129 n.2.
U.S. at 568 n.l (powell, J., concurring).
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lidity of subpoenas on Fifth Amendment grounds could be interposed
and would slow investigations-is similarly based on conjecture and
unsupported by authority. It seems doubtful that a third party would
object to a subpoena merely out of a desire not to cooperate with the
authorities. After all, such a course of conduct might result in the police focusing their attention on an individual previously believed innocent of any wrongdoing. And if the possessor of the evidence does have
a valid Fifth Amendment claim, there is no reason why he should not
be given an opportunity to assert it. Given the speculatiye nature of the
other problems cited by the Court, it is questionable whether this additional concern justifies the Court's endorsement of the belief that "the
warranted search is necessary to secure and to avoid the destruction of
evidence. "236
c.

The Impact of Zurcher on First Amendment Guarantees

At the root of the decision in Zurcher is the belief on the part of
the majority that searches authorized by warrants, when properly conducted, will not significantly impinge on the functioning of a free
press. 237 This belief and the specific conclusions derived therefrom by
the Court were challenged in Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Marshall joined. Although he agreed with the majority's
conclusion as to the permissibility of third-party searches under the
Fourth Amendment,238 Justice Stewart argued that the First Amendment's express grant of protection to the press justifies requiring the use
of a subpoena rather than a search warrant when the possessor of the
evidence is a newspaper. He found it "self-evident that police searches
of newspaper offices burden the freedom of the press,"239 pointing out
that such searches can be lengthy and disruptive240 and would necessarily entail police examination of materials obtained from informers
and other confidential sources-a prospect which could compel the
newspaper to engage in self-censorship.241
Regarding the detrimental effect such searches would have on the
vital confidential relationships developed by reporters, Justice Stewart
236. Id. at 563 (footnote omitted).
237. See notes 164-73 and accompanying text supra.
238. 436 U.S. at 571 n.1 (Stewart, J.,joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
239. £d. at 571.
240. Se~ e.g., Note, Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory. Fourth Amendment
and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957-59 (1976) (describing one search
of a Los Angeles radio station that lasted over eight hours).
241. 436 U.S. at 573 n.6 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
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distinguished the ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes,242 relied on by the majority,243 from the instant case. He pointed out that whereas Branzburg
dealt with "the more limited disclosure of a journalist's sources caused
by compelling him to testify,"244 the question in Zurcher was not
whether there is an absolute First Amendment privilege against disclosure, but rather what is the most appropriate and least burdensome
means of acquiring relevant evidence from a newspaper. 245 After reviewing the circumstances leading to the issuance of the search warrant,246 he concluded that no impediment to law enforcement had been
demonstrated in Zurcher, but that there was a great potential for harm
in the wake of the majority's decision.247
Media concern over the impact of the Zurcher decision may be
lessened if the legislature or the executive branch acts on the invitation
extended by the majority to enact suitable safeguards against abuses of
discretion in the issuance of search warrants directed at newspapers.248
II. The Broadcast Media and the First Amendment: Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation
In Federal Communications Commission v. Pac!fica Foundation,249
the United States Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has statutory and
constitutional authority to impose sanctions for the broadcasting oflanguage which, although not obscene, can be characterized as "indecent"
and "patently offensive" when broadcast at a time when children are
likely to be in the listening audience. 25o In resolving this question, the
Court considered whether non-obscene speech can properly be re242. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
243. See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
244. 436 U.S. at 574 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
245. Id.
246. See notes 181 & 182 and accompanying text supra.
247. 436 U.S. at 572-74 & n.8. Justice Stewart's concern over the effect the Zurcher decision will have on the press has been echoed by representatives of the mass media since the
decision was handed down. See, e.g., Javoslovsky, Police in the Newsroom: The Sta'!fOrd
Case, Wall St. J., June 20, 1978, at 20, cols. 4-6; Wall St. J., June 13, 1978, at 24, cols. 1-2;
S.F. Chronicle, June 27, 1978, at II, ools. 2-5.
248. See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
249. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
250. For discussions of the FCC's power to regulate obscene language, see generally,
Comment, Broadcasting Obscene Language: The Federal Communications Commission and
Section 1464 Violations, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 457 (1974); Note, Morality and the Broadcast
Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REV. 664
(1971); Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast
Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579 (1975); Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J.
1343 (1970).
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stricted as to the time, place and manner of its dissemination, and also
whether a distinction can constitutionally be drawn between "indecent"
and "obscene" language.
A.

The Decision

In the early afternoon of October 30, 1973, a man and his young
son were driving in New York City and listening to Station WBAI,
licensed to the Pacifica Foundation. A comedy monologue by satirist
George Carlin was being broadcast as part of a regularly scheduled live
program, "Lunchpail," whose subject that day was an analysis of attitudes towards language held by contemporary society. The monologue, entitled "Filthy Words," was originally delivered before a live
theatre audience, and sought to ridicule societal restrictions on the use
of certain words, especially over the airways.251 The father subsequently filed a complaint with the FCC stating that the airing of the monologue during a time when children were likely to be listening should
not have been permitted.
On February 21, 1975, the Commission responded to the complaint by issuing a Memorandum Opinion and Declaratory Order
granting the complaint and holding that Pacifica "could have been the
subject of administrative sanctions" for the broadcast. 25 :! The Commission derived its authority to regulate indecent broadcasting from 18
U.S.c. § 1464, which specifically prohibits "obscene, indecent or pro251. "Filthy Words" is a monologue from the live album "George Carlin, Occupation:
Foole," by Little David Records. A transcript of the monologue is appended to the decision
of the Supreme Court, 98 S. Ct. at 3041-43. The words identified by the satirist were "shit,"
"piss," "fuck," "cunt," "cocksucker," "motherfucker" and "tits." The) were not meant by
him to comprise an exhaustive list; to the "original seven" words, Carlin would add "fart,
turd, and twat." 98 S. Ct. at 3043. Although the FCC did not consider these additions to the
list in its opinion, holding only that the broadcast of the "original seven" was indecent, 56
F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), sanctions presumably could be imposed by the Commission in the
future should it be determined that "fart, turd, and twat" are indecent as well. Other words
might well be considered. For example, Georgia state Senator Julian Bond and the NAACP
have filed suit with the FCC seeking to have the word "nigger" add.:d to the list. S.F.
Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, Aug. 20, 1978 (World), at 27.
252. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975). The Commission declined to impose tbrmal sanctions on
Pacifica, noting instead that the Order would be "associated with the s\Jtion's license file,"
id., and would be considered in the event subsequent complaints were filed. Under 47
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1970), the Commission is empowered to impose forfeitures for violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). See note 253 i'!fra. Specifically: "(1) Any licensee or permittee
of a broadcast station who. . . (E) violates section. . . 1464 of Title 1S. shall forfeit to the
United States a sum not to exceed $1000. Each day during which such \ 101ation occurs shall
constitute a separate offense. Such forfeiture shall be in addition to an:- other penalty provided by this chapter." 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1970).
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fane language,"253 and from 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) which generally requires the Commission to "encourage the larger and more effective use
of radio in the public interest."254 In reaching its determination that
the Carlin monologue was indecent, the Commission first observed that
the broadcast medium has special qualities of intrusiveness which require a different standard of analysis than is normally applied to other,
less intrusive forms of expression.255 Particularly important to the
Commission was the possibility, recognized by the Supreme Court in
Miller v. Cal!fomia,256 that inherent in the broadcasting medium is" 'a
significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients
or of exposure to juveniles.' "257
Turning to the definition of "indecent," the Commission explained
that, in its view, the term was not subsumed under the concept of obscenity, but was instead subject to an independent definition.258 In reformulating the definition of "indecent" under section 1464,259 the
253. 56 F.C.C.2d at 94 n.lo 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) provides in full: "Whoever utters
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." The Commission
had previously defined "indecent" to mean material that is "(a) patently offensive by contemporary community standards; and (b) is utterly without redeeming social value." Eastern Educ. Radio (WUHy), 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 412 (1970).
254. 56 F.C.C.2d at 94 n.lo 47 U.S.c. § 303(g) (1970) outlines the general powers and
duties of the Commission.
255. 56 F.C.C.2d at 96-97. The Commission advanced four considerations in support of
its view that a different standard of analysis is required for the broadcast media: "(I)
[Clhildren have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2) radio
receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy interest is entitled to extra deference, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970); (3) unconsenting adults may tune
in a station without any warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and
(4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must therefore
license in the public interest." I d. at 97.
256. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See note 278 infta.
257. 56 F.C.C.2d at 97 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 19).
258. 56 F.C.C.3d at 97. The Commission cited three federal circuit court of appeals decisions in support of its position: United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972) (term
"indecent" not necessarily included within definition of "obscene" and should be defined on
retrial); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972) ("indecent" not defined by
court, but no prejudice to defendant where he was prosecuted only for using "obscene"
language); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966) (held reversible error
where trial court did not issue jury instructions defining the term "indecent").
Although no court had previously defined "indecent" under § 1464, the Commission
itself had, prior to Miller v. California, defined the term to mean that "the material broadcast is (a) patently offensive by contemporary standards; and (b) is utterly without redeeming social value." Eastern Educ. Radio (WUHy), 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 412 (1970). Inasmuch as
this definition was tied to the then existing obscenity standard, Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966), the Supreme Court's adoption of a new obscenity test in Miller
required the Commission to update its definition of "indecent."
259. See note 258 supra.
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Commission drew from the law of public nuisance. 26o Under nuisance
law, behavior is generally channelled rather than prohibited. Thus, the
Commission defined "indecent" to mean "language that describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and
organs, at times 0/ the day when there is a reasonable rb* that children
may be in the audience."261 Although the Commission did not impose
sanctions on the Pacifica Foundation, this new definition of "indecent"
would, in future cases, allow the Commission to enforce its conviction
that "such words [as the seven in the Carlin broadcast] are indecent
within the meaning of the statute and have no place on radio when
children are in the audience."262
In addition to the majority opinion, three concurring statements
were filed. Commissioner Reid approved of the majority viewpoint but
felt that it did not go far enough. In her opinion the indecent language
of the monologue was inappropriate for broadcast at any time, whether
night or day.263 Whereas the Commission sought to channel broadcasts so as to limit possible exposure to children, Commissioner Reid
would have prohibited indecent language from being broadcast at any
time. 264 This view was shared by Commissioner Quello. who noted his
support succinctly: "Garbage is garbage. . . . I believe such words are
reprehensive no matter what the broadcast hour."265
260. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. The Commission cited two federal decisions dealing with public
nuisance statutes as examples of the principles supporting its new cont""tual definition of
"indecent." See Von Sleichter v. United States, 472 F.2d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Williams v.
District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc). For criticIsm of the Commission's "nuisance" theory, see Chief Judge Bazelon's statement in favor of granting a rehearing en banc in Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcast v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 418-19 n.48
(D.C. Cir. 1975). See also, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 19 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring). On the use of nuisance analysis as a method of regulating obscenity, see generally, Note, Porno Non Est Pro Bono Publico: Obscenity as a Public Nuisance
in California, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385 (1977); Note, Restricting th.' Public .Display of
Ojfensive Materials: The Use and Ejfectiveness of Public and Private Nuisance Actions, 10
U.S.F. L. Rev. 232 (1975).
261. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (emphasis added).
262. Id. The Commission noted that a different standard for defining "indecent" might
conceivably be used in the late evening hours when few children are in the audience. The
definition would remain the same insofar as the language was concerned. I:e., words which
are patently offensive as measured by the contemporary community stand.lrds for the broadcast medium would remain prohibited. However, the Commission wt.'uld also consider
whether these late-evening expressions had serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973»).
263. 56 F.C.C.2d at 102 (Reid, Comm'r., concurring).
264. Id. See notes 260-61 and accompanying text supra.
265. 56 F.C.C.2d at 103 (Queilo, Comm'r., concurring).
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Commissioner Robinson, joined by Commissioner Hook, concurred in the issuance of the order, but offered a more extensive review
of the problems courts have faced in attempting to define the terms
"obscene" and "indecent."266 He noted that the "'core problem'-what constitutes obscenity-has never been satisfactorily unraveled."267 He noted as well that "people do not have an unlimited right
to avoid exposure to [obscenity]."268 In the view of Commissioners
Robinson and Hook, the Commission's decision, embracing a "nuisance" analysis, adopted a limited but pragmatic approach to accommodating the interests protected by the First Amendment and the
interests of the public in having the young protected from exposure to
inappropriate language.
Shortly after the issuance of the order, the Radio Television News
Directors Association (RTNDA) petitioned the Commission for clarification of the standards for determining indecency,269 The RTNDA
was concerned that the order would expose its members to the threat of
sanctions when "indecent" words were uttered in the context of bona
fide news or public affairs programs. The Commission reaffirmed its
earlier decision, however, stressing that the order was issued in a specific factual context and was based primarily on the need to protect
young children from sexually explicit language,27o The Commission
refused to comment on the hypothetical situations posed by the
RTNDA and reiterated its conclusion that such language could only be
broadcast, if at all, during the late evening hours,271
Following an appeal by the Pacifica Foundation, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the Commission,272 Circuit
Judge Tamm held that the order was issued in violation of the prohibition against censorship contained in 47 U.S.C. § 326,273 and that even if
266. Id. at 103 (Robinson, Comm'r., joined by Hook, Comm'r., concurring).
267. Id. at 104 (citing Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutionallssue-What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1961)).
268. 56 F.C.C.2d at 106 (Robinson, Comm'r., joined by Hook, Comm'r., concurring).
269. 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976).
270. Id. at 893.
271. Id.
272. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Chief Judge Baze10n and
Circuit Judge Tamm filed separate opinions in favor of reversal; a dissenting opinion was
entered by Circuit Judge Leventhal. For discussions of the Court of Appeals decision, see
Note, Pac!fica Foundation v. FCC- "Filthy Words.," the First Amendment and the Broadcast
Media, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 164 (1978); Note, Constitutional Law-Pac!fica Foundation v.
FCC: First Amendment Limitations on FCC Regulation of Offensive Broadcasts, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 584 (1978).
273. 556 F.2d at 18. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be
understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
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the Commission had the authority to regulate non-obscene speech, the
text of its order would have been subject to reversal on the grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth.274 The court of appeals was thus able to
reverse the Commission on grounds which circumvented the need to
define "indecent" under section 1464.
Chief Judge Bazelon concurred with the result reached by Judge
Tamm, but felt that the protections against censorship provided by section 326 were not absolute because the terms of section 1464 authorized
criminal punishment for anyone uttering "obscene, indecent, or pro. fane" language over the radio.275 Whereas Judge Tamm believed section 326 to be dispositive, Chief Judge Bazelon reformulated the issues
to focus first on whether the Carlin monlogue would be protected by
the First Amendment if disseminated by any other medium, a.nd second whether the unique characteristics of broadcasting justified an expansion of governmental regulation of speech.276 He concluded that
the Commission's definition of "indecency" was prima facie unconstitutionaP77 Citing the strict standard for obscenity set forth by the
Supreme Court in Miller v. Caltfornia,278 Chief Judge Bazelon found
the order to be an overbroad, distorted interpretation of those
guidelines. 279
Examining the four circumstances claimed by the Commission to
justify special regulation of speech disseminated over the broadcast medium,280 Chief Judge Bazelon rejected the contention that the broadcommunications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere \\ Ith the right of free
speech by means of radio communication."
In reversing the Commission, Judge Tamm stated his view that "[ajny examination of
thought or expression in order to prevent publication of objectionable material is censorship." 556 F.2d at 14.
274. Judge Tamm found the order to be vague because it lacked a defi.nition of children,
id. at 17, and that it was overbroad in that it prohibited the use of the se\<:n indecent words
in any context. Id.
275. See note 253 and accompanying text supra.
276. 556 F.2d at 20 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
277. Id. at 23.
278. 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973). In rejecting as the constitutional standard the "uller/y without redeeming social value" test articulated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419
(1966) (emphasis in original), the Court in Miller set forth the following basic guidelines:
"(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole; appeals to the prurient interest... ; (bl whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted).
279. 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
280. See note 255 supra.
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casting of offensive speech may offend the privacy interests of
nonconsenting adults in their homes. Relying on the Supreme Court
decisions in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,281 Cohen v. Cal!fornia,282
and Rowan v. Post Office Department,283 he reasoned that the radio listener "can avert his attention by changing channels or turning off the
set."284 The Commission's argument that the presence of children in
the listening audience justifies increased government regulation of
broadcast speech was also rejected on the ground that individual parental control is preferable to state action in loco parentis.285 Chief
Judge Bazelon concluded his concurring opinion by expressing disagreement with the contention that the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies and other considerations warranted the order promulgated by the
Commission.286
Circuit Judge Leventhal dissented and expressed his support for
the order. He argued that its definition of "indecent" was "a functional
equivalent to the Supreme Court's current 'obscenity' ruling
(Miller),"287 and that the time and place restrictions of the order were a
reasonable "constitutional trade-off."288 Unlike Judge Tamm289 and
Chief Judge Bazelon,290 Judge Leventhal did not find the order overbroad since, in his view, it was carefully limited by the Commission to
prohibit only the broadcasting of indecent language during the afternoon. 291 Nor, despite "some inexactness in the agency's approach," did
Judge Leventhal find the order void for vagueness. 292
281. 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (limited privacy interests of persons on public street cannot
justify censorship of otherwise protected speech).
'
282. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (absent particularized and compelling reasons, state may not
make public display of four-letter expletive a criminal offense).
283. 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (approval given to statutory scheme permitting addressee to
give notice that he wishes no further mailings from specific sender of erotic or sexually
provocative matter).
284. 556 F.2d at 26 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Bazelon also found that
people's privacy interests in their homes are reduced when they open up their home by
turning on the radio. Id. at 27.
285. Id. at 27-29.
286. Id. at 29. Chief Judge Bazelon believed that Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969), did not support the Commission's spectrum space arguments since unlike Red Lion, where the FCC's fairness doctrine raised questions of broadcast freedom and
public access to varied viewpoints, the instant case presented no divergence of First Amendment interests.
287. 556 F.2d at 32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 37.
289. Id. at 16-17.
290. Id. at 21 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
291. Id. at 36 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 35.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari,293 and in a five-four deci294
sion reversed the court of appeals on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens first
determined that in issuing its order, the Commission had not engaged
in formal rulemaking or the promulgation of regulations. Rather, the
Commission had simply adjudicated a dispute limited to the monologue "as broadcast" under 5 U.S.c. § 554(c).295 This initial determination not only permitted the Court to avoid issuing an advisory
opinion, but also served to focus attention on the precise factual context
underlying the Pac!fica litigation.
The Court analyzed the legislative purpose underlying section
296
326 and section 1464,297 and concluded that the prohibition against
censorship contained in section 326 does not so limit section 1464 as to
prevent the Commission from applying administrative sanctions
against licensees who "engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting.,,298 Justice Stevens next addressed the question of whether the
afternoon broadcast of the Carlin monologue was indecent within the
meaning of section 1464. Examining the language of the statute, he
reasoned that the words "obscene, indecent, or profane," are used in
the disjunctive and inferred that each word was intended to have a
separate and distinct meaning. Thus, the fact that the Carlin monologue lacked prurient appeal and was therefore not obscene under
Miller 299 did not preclude its being indecent under section 1464.
The Court rejected Pacifica's contention that the term "indecent"
in section 1464 should be interpreted in the same manner as it is under
18 U.S.C. § 1461. Section 1461 prohibits the use of the United States
mails to disseminate, inter alia, obscene and indecent matter. 3OO The
293. 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
294. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, Powell (Parts I. II, III & IV(C)),
and an opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined (Parts IV(A) &
IV(B)). Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Blackmunjoined. Justice
Brennan,joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Stewart filed a separate dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, White and Marshall joined.
295. Id. at 3032. Section 554(e) provides: "The agency, with like effect as in the case of
other orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty." 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1976).
296. See note 273 supra.
297. See note 253 supra.
298. 98 S. Ct. at 3035. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the two sections, now
separate, had together previously formed § 29 of the Radio Act of 1927.
299. See note 278 supra.
.
300. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). Pacifica argued that the Court's interpretation of§ 1461 in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), which had subsumed "indecent" under the
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two statutes were distinguished on the basis of their subject matter; section 1461 involves printed matter whereas section 1464 relates solely to
broadcasting. Finding no controlling definition of "indecent," Justice
Stevens concluded that there was no basis for disagreeing with the
Commission's determination that the language used in the afternoon
broadcast was indecent and therefore subject to sanction. 30 !
Having resolved the statutory issues, Justice Stevens' opinion
turned to the constitutional challenges raised by Pacifica. This section
of the opinion did not command the support of Justices Powell and
Blackmun. 302 In reviewing the claim that the Commission's order was
overbroad and encompassed constitutionally protected speech, Justice
Stevens observed that the Court's scope of review was limited to the
issue of whether the Commission had the authority to prohibit this particular broadcast.303 He pointed out that the order was properly limited
to a specific factual situation, and asserted that "indecency is largely a
function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract."304
Admitting that the order might lead to some self-censorship by broadcasters and that the particular language of the Carlin monologue might
be protected when used in some other context, Justice Stevens argued
that the seven indecent words "surely lie at the periphery of First
Amendment concern."305 The issues having been narrowed to the
question of whether "the First Amendment prohibits all governmental
regulation that depends on the content of speech,"306 Justice Stevens
proceeded to determine that speech of the sort contained in the broadcast "is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances."307 Justices Powell and Blackmun did not share the
concept of obscenity, should be controlling. Without disputing that interpretation of
Hamling, Justice Stevens found it inapplicable to the present case. 98 S. Ct. at 3035-36.
301. Id. at 3036.
302. In failing to receive the support of Justices Powell and Blackmun, who did not join
Parts IV (A) and (B) of the opinion, Justice Stevens spoke only for a plurality of the Court in
his discussion of the constitutional issues. Part IV (C) of Justice Stevens' opinion, which
Justices Powell and Blackmun did join, emphasized that "of all forms of communication, it
is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection." Id. at
3040.
303. Id. at 3037.
304. Id.
305. Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commercial speech);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult films».
306. 98 S. Ct. at 3038.
307. Id. at 3039. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commercial speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult films); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel of private citizen); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel of
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plurality view that content can be used to determine which speech is
more "valuable" and therefore more deserving of First Amendment
protection.308 They did agree, however, that the result in Pacifica
should turn on the context of the speech at issue. 309
Justice Stevens, again writing for a majority of the Court, examined the basis for the Commission's conclusion that the special characteristics of the broadcast medium permit the imposition of
restrictions on the use of language such as that contained in the Carlin
monologue. 310 He agreed with the Commission that broadcasting has a
pervasive influence on American life and observed that the listeners'
ability to turn off broadcasts of objectionable material is an insufficient
means of protecting the privacy of the home from unwanted and objectionable programing. 311 He characterized this answer to the problem as
being akin to "saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after
the first blow."312 In reversing the court of appeals, the majority also
relied on the unique accessibility of broadcasts to children. This ease
of access was found to "amply justify special treatment of indecent
broadcasting."313
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a stronglyworded dissent in which he argued that the Court's decision validates a
process "of governmental homogenization of radio communications"314 and "permits majoritarian tastes completely to preclude a protected message from entering the homes of a receptive, unoffended
minority."315 Reiterating Chief Judge Bazelon's argument,316 Justice
Brennan contended that listeners who find such language offensive can
turn the radio off with a minimum amount of effort. 317 He argued that
public official); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (194~) (fighting words);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (clear and present danger).
308. 98 S. Ct. at 3046 (powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring).
309. Id. at 3047. See note 313 infra.
310. See note 255 and accompanying text supra.
311. 98 S. Ct. at 3040.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 3040-41. In agreeing with the majority's conclusion, Justice Powell stated:
"The result turns. . . on the unique characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with
society'S right to protect its children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for
their years, and with the interest of unwilling adults in not being assaulted by such offensive
speech in their homes." Id. at 3047 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Biackmun, J.).
314. Id. at 3048 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 3049.
316. See notes 280-86 and accompanying text supra.
317. 98 S. Ct. at 3049 (Brennan, J., dissenting): Although agreeing that the individual's
privacy interests in his home are substantial, Justice Brennan stated that "an individual's
actions in switching on and listening to communications transmitted over the public airways
and directed to the public at-large do not implicate fundamental privacy interests, even
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the availability of this alternative justifies preserving the broadcaster's
right to disseminate and its listeners' right to receive offensive but
nonetheless constitutionally protected messages, especially since the effect of the Court's decision is to replace individual choice as to what is
heard with governmental regulation of program content. 318
Justice Brennan found the majority's reliance on the unique accessibility of broadcasts to children319 equally unpersuasive. In his view,
the Carlin monologue could not be considered obscene even as to the
children.320 The majority decision could therefore result in the screening from adults of material which could not constitutionally be kept
from children.32I And even conceding that most parents would not
want their children to hear language such as that contained in the
broadcast at issue, Justice Brennan observed that this decision properly
resides with the parents and not in the government acting in loco
porentis.322 Addressing the majority's contention that the ideas embodied in the Carlin monologue could just as well have been expressed
with less offensive language,323 Justice Brennan cited Justice Harlan's
opinion for the Court in Cohen v. Col!fornio 324 for the proposition that
restricting the use of certain words creates a substantial risk that the
ideas those words convey will concurrently be restricted. 325
when engaged in within the home. Instead, because the radio is undeniably a public medium, these actions are more properly viewed as a decision to take part, if only as a listener,
in an ongoing public discourse." Id: at 3048 (citing Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the
First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579, 618 (1975».
318. 98 S. Ct. at 3049 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
319. See note 313 and accompanying text supra.
320. 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 213-14 & n.lO (1975).
321. 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383-84 (1957) (state may not restrict adults to reading only what is appropriate for children).
This fear is valid only insofar as the FCC would fail to limit its prohibition against the
broadcasting of "indecent" language to those hours when children are likely to be in the
listening audience. See notes 261-62 and accompanying text supra.
322. 98 S. Ct. at 3051 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that this substitution of governmental authority for parental discretion distinguished Pac!fica from the
Court's prior decisions in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Although the majority stressed the principle that parents have a
right to raise their children as they see fit, see 98 S. Ct. at 3040, Justice Brennan observed
that the majority decision actually deprives parents of that right by giving what would otherwise be a parental responsibility to screen media programming to a government agency. Id.
at 3051 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 3037 n.18.
324. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
325. "[W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force." Id. at
26. And as Justice Brennan explained: "The idea that the content of a message and its
potential impact on any who might receive it can be divorced from the words that are the
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The concluding portion of Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
charged the majority with falling victim to an "acute ethnocentric myopia."326 He accused the majority of failing to acknowledge that the
supposedly offensive language at issue in Pac!fica is in fact "the stuff of
everyday conversations" in many of America's subcultures. 327 Thus,
Justice Brennan concluded that when viewed in a broad perspective,
the decision was "another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to
force those groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of
thinking, acting, and speaking."328
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White and
Marshall, Justice Stewart criticized the majority's resolution of the
question of whether broadcasting is entitled to less First Amendment
protection than other forms of speech. 329 Justice Stewart would not
have reached the constitutional issues since, in his view, the Court
should not have construed "indecent" as having a broader meaning
than "obscene."33o He would have followed the Court's decision in
Hamling v. United States 331 and held that "Congress intended, by using
the word 'indecent' in section 1464, to prohibit nothing more than obscene speech."332 In the view of the four dissenting justices, the term
"indecent" should therefore have been construed for purposes of section 1464 as it had been in Hamling, with the result that the Carlin
monologue-concededly not appealing to prurient interests-would
not have been stripped of its First Amendment protections.
B. Analysis

The Court's Pac!fica decision can best be analyzed by a two-part
consideration. The sections that follow will examine the reasoning underlying the majority's rejection of both the statutory and constitutional
challenges to the Commission's order. They will also analyze whether
the Court's judgment is consistent with prior decisions concerning the
constitutionally permis'sible extent of regulation of protected speech.
vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious. A given word may have a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an image." 98 S. Ct. at 3053
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 3054.
327. Id.
328. Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506-11 (1977».
329. 98 S. Ct. at 3055-57. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 3056.
331. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). Hamling held that the term "indecent" in IS U.S.C. § 1461 has
the same meaning as "obscene" under the Court's decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
IS (1973). See note 278 supra.
332. 98 S. Ct. at 3056 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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1. The Statutory Claims

Circuit Judge Tamm, author of the court of appeals decision; construed 47 U.S.C. § 326333 to prohibit the FCC from interfering with
licensee discretion in programming. He cited prior FCC and federal
court cases which he argued established an agency practice of relying
on each licensee's judgment regarding program content. 334 This argument is also supported by Jack Straw Memorial Foundation ,335 wherein
the Commission held that the decision whether or not to broadcast obscene or indecent language should be left to the licensee. That case
involved the broadcasting of admittedly obscene language which was
part of a recording entitled "Murder at Kent State." The licensee
broadcast the language based on his decision that it was necessary in
the context of the recording. The Commission found this exercise of
licensee discretion to be in conformity with its standards. 336
Judge Tamm also noted that the section 326 prohibition against
FCC interference with licensee judgement as to programming content
had been affirmed by the courts as well as by administrative rulingS. 337
He found additional support for his contention that licensee discretion
should be preserved in the language of the Commission's clarification
memorandum regarding the original order. 338 He pointed out that the
memorandum acknowledged that (I) some live news coverage of public
events involves broadcasting offensive speech in circumstances which
preclude journalistic editing, and (2) licensees who broadcast such language should not be subject to Commission discipline. 339 The Commission had therefore once again deferred to the judgment of
individual licensees with respect to programming content.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon noted his agreement with Judge Tamm's section 326 argument and asserted that the
Commission's action in "channeling" broadcasts of indecent language
into certain hours amounted to censorship.340 He pointed to repeated
333. See note 273 supra.
334. 556 F.2d at 14-15 (1977).
335. 29 F.C.C.2d 334 (1971).
336. Id. at 354.
337. 556 F.2d at 14. See, e.g., Writers Guild of America, West. Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp.
1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169
(1968), cerl. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
338. 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976). See notes 268-71 and accompanying text supra.
339. 556 F.2d at 14-15.
340. Id. at 19 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Bazelon found that the § 326
prohibition is not limited to rules and regulations that totally forbid the broadcasting of
certain matter, but also bars any form of Commission censorship. He argued that "channeling may have substantially the same effect as ali absolute l?an." Id.
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FCC abuses of its limited authority to regulate constitutionally protected speech as one basis for his opposition to any weakening of section 326.341 In the collective view of Chief Judge Baze10n and Judge
Tamm, the FCC order in Pacifica violated the prohibition against censorship contained in section 326 by permitting the imposition of sanctions for the broadcasting of the language at issue.
Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens
agreed that section 326 bars the Commission from editing proposed
broadcasts in advance. He asserted, however, that this prohibition had
, never operated to deny the Commission power to review the content of
completed broadcasts or to take note of the nature of past programs
when considering license renewal applications. 342 He further noted
that judicial and administrative interpretations of section 326 have developed the view that its anti-censorship provision does not apply to the
broadcasting of obscene, indecent or profane language. 3.t3 In analyzing
this point of disagreement between the Supreme Court and the court of
appeals, it should be noted that the Commission's order did not merely
examine the past programming of one radio station. Instead, it established a new standard for determining permissible language and put
broadcasters on notice that the language at issue in Pac/fica was not to
be broadcast during certain hours. While it might be argued that such
a decree does not amount to pre-broadcast censorship. it creates the
possibility of an even more dangerous situation, one in which broadcasters censor themselves by excising protected as well as unprotected
speech due to excessive caution.344
The second statutory issue in Pacifica concerned the interpretation
of 18 U.S.c. § 1464345 and the question of whether the terms "obscene"
and "indecent" have separate meanings. 346 This problem arises in
many situations involving the regulation of obscene language, due to
the practice of including a string of generic terms in obscenity statutes.
Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 prohibits the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" articles and 18 U.S.c. § 1464 prohibits the
broadcasting of "obscene, indecent, or profane language." As a consequence of this practice, the question arose as to whether the terms following "obscene" in these and similar statutes are subsumed under the
341. Id. at 19 n.l.
342. 98 S. Ct. at 3033.
343. Id. at 3034.
344. Justice Stevens admitted that the Commission order created the possibility of selfcensorship. See id. at 3037.
345. See note 253 supra.
346. 98 S. Ct. at 3035-36.
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parameters of that which is obscene or are meant to establish additional limitations.
Pacifica argued that unless the term "indecent" in section 1464 was
held to mean only "obscene," the statute would be unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.347 This contention was based on the premise
that the Supreme Court had defined obscenity in Miller v. Cal!fornia,348
and had subsequently made it clear in Hamling v. United States 349 and
United States v. 12200-Ft. Reels-oj" Super 8mm Film 350 that the use of
the term "indecent" in federal criminal statutes must be construed to
refer only to materials involving the specific types of explicit conduct
set forth in Miller. 351 In 12200-Ft. Reels of Film, the Court suggested
that the term "indecent" should be understood as referring only to representations or depictions of "hard core" sexuality:
If and when. . . a "serious doubt" is raised as to the vagueness
of the words "obscene," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy,"
"indecent," or "immoral" as used to describe regulated material
in ... 18 U.S.C. § 1462 . . . we are prepared to construe such
terms as limiting regulated material to patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specfftc "hard core" sexual conduct
given as examples in Miller v. Cal!fornia . . . .352
The Court in Miller had offered the following examples of speech that
could constitutionally be regulated: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual
or simulated; (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals."353 Pacifica argued that it followed from these standards established by the Court that the Carlin monologue was not obscene, since it
neither appealed to the prurient interest nor lacked literary or political
value.354 Consequently, the argument concluded, the monologue was
entitled to constitutional protection and the Commission's order should
be adjudged overbroad.355
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon accepted Pacifica's
overbreadth argument. He noted that the Commission's test for "indecency" did not consider the language at issue in light of the "local com347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

556 F.2d at 12.
413 U.S. 15 (1973). See note 278 supra.
418 U.S. 87 (1974). See note 331 supra.
413 U.S. 123 (1973).
See note 278 supra.
413 U.S. at 130 n.7 (emphasis added).
413 U.S. at 25.
See id. at 24.
556 F.2d at 18.
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munity standards" impliedly required by Miller, but rather used
"contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium" as its
touchstone. 356 Chief Judge Bazelon pointed out that the Commission's
indecency standard also ignored the Miller requirement that a work be
judged as a whole, and that it must appeal to prurient interests to be
considered obscene.357 He noted that the FCC standard would preclude the broadcasting of indecent language despite the fact that the
overall work contained literary, artistic, political or scientific value.358
Consequently, Chief Judge Bazelon concluded that the definition of
"indecency" in the Commission's order could be upheld only if "there
exists an additional category of offensive speech that is unprotected
when broadcast."359
Chief Judge Bazelon's conclusion was prophetic, in that the
Supreme Court subsequently did carve out such an additional category
of unprotected speech in Pac!fica. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found that "indecency" was not subsumed under the definition of
"obscene." He refined the appeal to prurient interest standard enunciated in Miller 360 by holding that indecency "merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality."361 Responding to the
argument that the conclusion in Hamling that section 1461's proscription was limited to language falling within the Miller definition of obscenity362 was controlling, Justice Stevens distinguished that case on the
basis of the different form of media involved there. Since section 1461
concerns printed matter sent by mail, he reasoned that the construction
placed on it by the Court was inapplicable to a statute such as section
1464, which deals with public broadcasting. 363 Pacifica's reliance on 12
200-fl. Reels of Film was dismissed as being based on dicta. 364
Writing for four members of the Court,365 Justice Stewart rejected
the majority's interpretation of section 1464. He argued that this con356. Id. at 22 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (citing 51 F.C.C.2d at 433).
357. 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). See 413 U.S. at 24
358. 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). All of these criteria were enunciated in
Miller. See note 278 supra.
359. 556 F.2d at 24 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
360. See 413 U.S. at 24.
361. 98 S. Ct. at 3035 (footnote omitted). The Court's adoption of this definition raises
several questions, such as what constitutes "nonconformance," whose st.tndards of morality
are to be considered "accepted," and how these standards are to be communicated to
broadcasters.
362. See note 331 supra.
363. 98 S. Ct. at 3036 & nn.16-17.
364. Id. at 3035.
365. Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Brennan, White and Marshall.
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struction of the statute was plausible but "by no means compelled,"
and that "indecent" should be defined to mean "no more than 'obscene.' "366 Justice Stewart agreed with Pacifica that the decision in
Hamling was dispositive of the section 1464 interpretation issue. He
noted that the Hamling Court had limited section 1461 so as to proscribe only those representations or descriptions of hard core sexual
conduct set out in Miller. 367 Justice Stewart could find no adequate
basis for the majority's conclusion that the term "indecent" had different meanings in each of these statutes. He concluded by noting that
although sections 1461 and 1464 were enacted separately, they were
codified together in the 1948 Criminal Code under the chapter entitled
"Obscenity," which suggested that Congress intended that section 1464,
like section 1461, should prohibit only obscene speech. 368
2. The Constitutional Claims

The Supreme Court produced a majority decision in resolving the
statutory issues in Pactfica. The constitutional questions, however,
fragmented the Court. Most of Justice Stevens' constitutional discussion did not command the support of a majority of the Court, but was
joined only by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger. Justice
Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice Blackmun, which set forth his disagreement with certain of the conclusions
reached by Justice Stevens. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a bitter dissenting opinion in which he addressed the constitutional issues.369
For Justice Brennan to serve as a spokesman for the dissenters in a
Supreme Court obscenity decision is a significant indication of the
shifting tides of interpretation in this area of constitutional law. Justice
Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Roth v. United States,370
wherein the Court first promulgated a uniform standard for determining what speech is obscene. He also authored the plurality opinion in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts,371 which further refined the Roth standard.
By 1973, however, the composition of the Court had changed, and Jus366. 98 S. Ct. at 3056 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
367. Id. See note 353 and accompanying text supra.
368. Id. at 3056 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
369. Justices Stewart and White expressed no opinion regarding the merits of the constitutional issues in Pac!ftca. They believed that the construction of § 1464 set out in Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion, see notes 366-68 and accompanying text supra, made a constitutional analysis unnecessary.
370. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
371. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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tice Brennan found himself in the minority when Miller was decided.
He also dissented in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,3T2 and urged the
Court to abandon its quest for a viable definition of "obscenity," at
least insofar as consenting adults were concerned. 373 Justice Brennan
continued to fill the role of minority spokesman in Pac!fica.
The first of the two constitutional questions considered by Justice
Stevens' plurality opinion was whether the Commission's order was
overbroad in that it permitted the imposition of sanctions on the broadcasting of constitutionally protected speech. Justice Stevens began by
noting that the Court's review of the order was limited to the question
of whether it was appropriate in the specific factual context of the
case. 374 Although acknowledging that the order may cause some
broadcasters to engage in self-censorship, he asserted that this will only
occur in situations where the material to be broadcast contains "patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities."37s Such self-censorship, he argued, will not significantly affect
the content of serious communication because "[t]here are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language."376 Justice Stevens therefore concluded that invalidating the
FCC order solely to preserve "the vigor of patently offensive sexual
... speech" was unwarranted. 377
The second constitutional question which the plurality addressed
was whether the First Amendment precludes the government from
punishing the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances. Justice Stevens acceded to the principle that the First Amendment requires the government to "remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas," but he argued that the speech at issue in Pacifica was not an
essential part of that marketplace. 378 In Justice Stevens' view, the question was not whether the Carlin monologue was protected speech under
any circumstances, but rather whether it warranted protection under
the circumstances in which it was broadcast. Thus, although the Commission itself recognized that the monologue had some literary and po372. 413 u.S. 49 (1973).
373. Id. at 84-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
374. 98 S. Ct. at 3037 (plurality opinion).
375. Id. (footnote omitted).
376. Id. at n.18.
377. Id. at 3037.
378. Id. at 3038-39: "These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends."
(Footnote omitted). It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Justic~ Stevens' attempt to
delineate how the term "indecency" has a separate meaning apart from the concept of "obscenity." See notes 297-98 and accompanying text supra.

Fall 1978]

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

73

litical value and expressed a point of view, its objection focused on the
manner in which that view was expressed.379 Justice Stevens concluded
this analysis by noting that since the content of the broadcast at issue
was "vulgar," "offensive" and "shocking," the Court was required to
examine the context of its dissemination to determine whether the
Commission's actions were constitutionaP80
As previously noted, Justices Powell and Blackmun did not join in
the foregoing constitutional analysis. Justice Powell expressed his disagreement with the plurality because he could not "subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are free generally to decide on the
basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment is
most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most protection, and which
is less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection."381 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan also voiced dissatisfaction with the
analysis utilized in Justice Stevens' plurality opinion. He noted that a
majority of the Court had rejected the notion "that the degree of protection the First Amendment affords protected speech varies with the
social value ascribed to that speech by five Members of this Court."382
Justice Brennan also took issue with the plurality's assertion that the
FCC order would not chill free expression because language such as
that at issue in Pac!ftca is unnecessary to serious communication. 383 He
found it "fallacious" to presume that the content of a message could be
divorced from the language used to express it.384
The only constitutional question on which the Court produced a
majority opinion was whether the unique characteristics of the broadcast medium warranted a lower level of First Amendment protection.
True to Chief Judge Bazelon's suggestion,385 the Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative. Writing for a majority on this
issue, Justice Stevens noted that of all forms of communication, broad379. 98 S. Ct. at 3038-39 & n.22 (plurality opinion).
380. Id. at 3039. It is important to note that these constitutional questions were not resolved by a majority of the Court. Justice Stevens' discussion of these issues is therefore of
only limited precedential value.
381. Id. at 3046 (powell, J., concurring). Justices Powell and Blackmun did concur with
Justice Stevens' resolution of the statutory issues and in the judgment of the Court. See note
313 supra.
382. 98 S. Ct. at 3047 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 3046-47 (powell, J., concurring». Accord, Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
383. Id. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 375-76 and accompanying text
supra.
384. Id. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 322-25 and accompanying text
supra. Accord, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
385. See text accompanying note 359 supra.·
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casting has received "the most limited First Amendment protection."386
He advanced two justifications for this disparate treatment: 1) broadcasting has "established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans," jeopardizing individual privacy rights; and 2) broadcasting is "uniquely accessible to children," which implicates the government's interest in the "well being of its youth" and warrants greater
regulation of this particular form of communication. 3s7 Justice Powell's concurring opinion also stressed the effect the broadcast media has
on children and emphasized that this was a significant factor in his
joining Justice Stevens' opinion to create a majority.3SS He noted that
"[t]he language involved in this case is as potentially degrading and
harmful to children as representations of many erotic acts."389
The Supreme Court in Pac[fica delineated another category of
speech, broadcasting, that is entitled to only limited First Amendment
protection. 390 Although the majority attempted to limit its holding to a
specific factual context,391 its reasoning would seem to leave open the
possibility of further expanding the Commission's power to regulate
the broadcasting of "indecent" speech. 392 The decision evinces increasing concern for individual privacy rights and the need to shield children from expression viewed as inappropriate for them. 393 If in the
future the Commission finds that "indecent" language was broadcast at
386. 98 S. Ct. at 3040.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 3044-45 (Powell, J., concurring).
389. Id. at 3045. Justice Powell also noted that broadcasting implicates fundamental
privacy interests of the individual in his home. In his view, this factor justifies broadcasting
regulations that would be constitutionally impermissible if imposed upon other forms of
media. See id. at 3045-46. For Justice Brennan's response to the majority's rationale for
extending less First Amendment protection to the broadcast media, see notes 314-22 and
accompanying text supra.
390. 98 S. Ct. at 3040. Justice Stevens argued that "indecent" speech lies "at the periphery of First Amendment concern," id. at 3037, but this part of his opinion was joined only by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 3046-47 & n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). The result in Pac!fica actually turned on the unique characteri$tics of the broadcast
media. See id. at 3040-41 (majority opinion), 3047 (powell, J., concurring). For other categories of speech that are entitled to only limited First Amendment protection, see, e.g., Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commercial speech); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult films).
391. See 98 S. Ct. at 3041 (majority opinion), 3047 (powell, J., concurring).
392. See id. at 3051-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that the absence of "principled limits" on the Commission's power in this area could lead to "the
cleansing of public radio of any 'four-letter words' whatsoever, regardless of their context."
Id. at 3051. He pointed out that this might result in the banning from radio of noted literary
works, political speech and portions of the Bible. Id. at 3051-52.
393. See id. at 3040-41 (majority opinion), 3044-46 (Powell, J., concurring).
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a time when children were likely to be in the listening audience,394 the
Court's rationale in deciding Pac[jica would justify the imposition of
criminal sanctions or other punishment on the disseminator.
III. The Clergy and the Right to Hold Public Office: McDaniel P. Poly

The Supreme Court in Mc.Daniel P. Paty395 considered, but failed
fully to clarify, the scope of religious freedom under the First Amendment.396 The question posed in McDaniel was whether the state of
Tennessee could bar an individual from seeking an elective position
solely because of his status as a practicing minister. The decision in
McDaniel reveals a Court united in agreement that the Tennessee provision was unconstitutional but divided over the legal basis for that
conclusion.
A.

The Decision

Paul McDaniel, a Baptist minister, was a candidate for a position
as a delegate to the 1977 Tennessee constitutional convention. An opponent, Selma Cash Paty, sued in State Chancery Court for a judgment
declaring McDaniel disqualified from serving as a delegate to the convention. The basis for her claim was a Tennessee statute which barred
ministers from seeking this position.397 The Chancery Court held that
the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution and declared McDaniel an eligible candidate. In the subsequent election, he was elected by a large margin. After the election, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the
394. See note 261 and accompanying text supra.
395. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Last term the Court also decided another case relating to freedom of religion, New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977). The Court in Cathedral Academy held that a New York statute authorizing reimbursement to parochial schools
for expenses incurred in performing state-required services during the 1971-72 school year
violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. See note 396 iifra.
396. The First Amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I
(emphasis added).
397. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 848, § 4: "Any citiz:n of the state who can qualify for
membership in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly may become a candidate for delegate to the convention. . . ." The requirements for membership in the legislature include a specific constitutional limitation on participation by the clergy. This
limitation was originally contained in article VIII, § I of the 1796 Tennessee Constitution
and is now found in article IX, § 1 of the present state constitution: "Whereas Ministers of
the Gospel are by their profession, dedicated to God and the care of Souls, and ought not to
be diverted from the great duties of their functions; therefore, no Minister of the Gospel, or
priest of any denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the
Legislature."
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Chancery Court on the ground that the statute imposed no burden
upon "religious belief' and restricted "religious action ... [only] in
the law making process of government-where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the establishment clause."398 The Tennessee Court
found a sufficient state interest in maintaining a separation between
political and religious activity to warrant the disqualification,399
notwithstanding the guarantee of the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment.4°O The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction,401 and subsequently reversed the decision of the Tennessee
Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of the Court,402 began
his bpinion by tracing the history of the practice of disqualifying ministers from legislative office.403 Drawing from the works of Locke, Jefferson and Madison, the Chief Justice reviewed the historical debate over
the necessity of excluding ministers from such positions.404 He concluded this review by noting that of the thirteen states which originally
disqualified members of the clergy, only two, Maryland and Tennessee,
continued this ban into the twentieth century.405 In 1974, Maryland's
statute was found unconstitutional as an infringement of the free exercise of religion by a federal district court,406 leaving Tennessee as the
only state maintaining a bar on clergy holding public office. Despite
this singular position, the Tennessee statute came to the Court with the
full support of the state's legislative and judicial branches, a posture
recognized as supplying a presumption of validity which the Court did
not summarily reject.
Notwithstanding this presumption, the plurality found that by
conditioning McDaniel's right to seek public office on the surrender of
his right to perform religious functions, Tennessee had impermissibly
encroached upon his free exercise of religion.407 Chief Justice Burger
reached this conclusion by relying on the Court's decision in Sherbert v.
Verner. 408 The Court in Sherbert held that a state's refusal to grant
398. Paty v. McDaniel, Tenn., 547 S.W.2d 897, 903 (1977).
399. £d. at 905.
400. See note 396 supra.
401. 432 U.S. 905 (1977) (mem).
402. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist
and Stevens. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
403. See generally I A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950).
404. 435 U.S. at 622-25.
405. Id. at 625.
406. Kirkley v. Maryland, 381 F. Supp. 327 (D. Md. 1974).
407. 435 U.S. at 626.
408. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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unemployment benefits to an individual who was unable to find work
because her religious beliefs prohibited her from working on Saturdays
imposed an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion. 409
The Chief Justice distinguished the instant case from the Court's decision in Torcaso v. Watkins,410 reasoning that Torcaso struck down a
requirement limiting religious helief, whereas the Tennessee statute
pertained to religious conduct or activity.411 Focusing on McDaniel's
status as a minister, the plurality concluded that the free exercise
clause's "absolute prohibition of infringements on the 'freedom to believe' [was] inapposite here."412
Because an infringement upon First Amendment values had been
found,. Chief Justice Burger scrutinized the state interests claimed to
justify the ban on ministers holding public office.413 The state had argued that granting ministers the right to hold office would result in
their exercise of legislative power and influence to promote the interests
of one particular sect, thus pitting one sect against another and adding
destructive religious conflict to the already difficult task of running a
state government.414 The plurality was not persuaded by these asserted
justifications and found that Tennessee had failed to establish that the
historically based view of the dangers of clergy participation in the political processes had contemporary validity.415 Consequently, the
Court held the Tennessee statute violative of the First Amendment
right to the free exercise of religion. 416
Justice Brennan filed a lengthy concurring opinion417 in which he
argued that the decision in Torcaso 418 should be controlling. He re409. Id. at 403-06.
410. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso the Court invalidated a Maryland constitutional
requirement that applicants for public office declare their belief in God. The Court held that
this test violated the freedom of belief and religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 496.
411. 435 U.S. at 627 (footnote omitted).
412. Id.
413. Chief Justice Burger cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972), for the
proposition that "[t)he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." 435 U.S. at 628 & n.8. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan questioned this reliance. See id. at 635 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring).
414. Paty v. McDaniel, Tenn., 547 S.W.2d at 904-06. The Tennessee Supreme Court
referred to the religious wars in Ireland and Lebanon as examples "that the human race has
not advanced to a degree of civilization that will permit us to conclude that the fervor of
religion will never again disturb and disrupt secular affairs and government." Id. at 906.
415. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. at 629.
416. Id.
417. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall.
418. See note 410 supra.
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jected the distinction relied upon by the plurality between religious belief and religious conduct or activity.419 Justice Brennan pointed out
that "freedom of belief protected by the Free Exercise Clause embraces
freedom to profess or practice that belief, even including doing so to
earn a livelihood."420 In addition to the free exercise violation, Justice
Brennan found that the Tennessee statute violated the establishment
clause.421 He noted that except in a few, limited situations, government
cannot use religion as a basis for imposing "duties, penalties, privileges
or benefits."422 Justice Brennan concluded his opinion by stating his
faith in the self-corrective nature of the political process. He asserted
that all individuals should have an opportunity to present their views in
the "marketplace of ideas" for acceptance or rejection at the polls.423
Justice Stewart filed a brief concurring opinion in which he voiced
his agreement with Justice Brennan that Torcaso should be controlling.
He found the differences between the two cases to be without constitutional significance.424 Justice Stewart rejected the plurality's view that
religious status and religious belief are separable for purposes of free
exercise analysis. 425 He argued that the Tennessee statute "penalized
an individual for his religious status-for what he is and believes
in-rather than for any particular act generally deemed harmful to
society. "426
Justice White filed a concurring opinion in which he offered a
wholly different rationale for the Court's judgment. He found that the
Tennessee statute which absolutely prohibited members of a particular
class, in this case ministers, from holding public office, to be in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice White adopted this approach because the plurality and concurring
opinions failed to persuade him that McDaniel's free exercise of religion was in any way restricted by the Tennessee statute.427 Using an
equal protection analysis, however, Justice White concluded that the
state's interests were insufficient to warrant excluding the affected
class.428 This conclusion was further supported by his finding that the
419. 435 U.S. at 634 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring). See notes 410-12
and accompanying text supra.
420. 435 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
421. See note 396 supra.
422. 435 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J.,joined by Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
423. Id. at 642.
424. Id. at 642-43 (Stewart, J., concurring).
425. See notes 410-12 and accompanying text supra.
426. 435 U.S. at 643 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring).
427. Id. at 643-44 (White, J., concurring).
428. Id. at 645: "All'50 States are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
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Tennessee statute was both underinclusive and overinclusive.429
B.

Analysis

The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court in McDaniel is
not surprising in light of the disappearance of clergy-disqualification
statutes elsewhere in the United States.430 The differences in approach,
however, warrant examination. Seven members of the Court431 believed that the protection afforded by the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment compelled the reversal of the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court. Beyond this consensus, these justices produced
three different opinions; two favored the interpretation of Torcaso set
forth by Justice Brennan,432 while the plurality distinguished Torcaso
and relied on Sherbert. 433
The issue separating these two segments of the Court is how far
the scope of the free exercise clause can be extended in the face oflegitimate state interests.434 The view derived from Torcaso, that any statute which compels an individual to eschew protected religious practices
as a condition of office is unconstitutional,435 was rejected by a plurality
of the Court. The plurality instead found that the Tennessee disqualification provision operated against McDaniel because of his status as a
minister. 436 Stating that the meaning of "minister" or "priest" is a
maintain a separation between church and state, and yet all of the States other than Tennessee are able to achieve this objective without burdening ministers' rights to candidacy. This
suggests that the underlying assumption on which the Tennessee statute is based-that a
minister's duty to the superiors of his church will interfere with his governmental service-is
unfounded."
429. Id. Justice White pointed out that the statute was underinclusive in that its limitations did not apply to executive and judicial office-seekers. He found the statute to be overinclusive since it also applied to ministers whose religious beliefs would not interfere with
the proper discharge of the duties of a delegate to the constitutional convention.
430. See notes 405 & 406 and accompanying text supra. The decision in McDaniel technically leaves intact the Tennessee Constitution's bar on clergy serving as legislators, since
only the statute relating to constitutional convention delegates was invalidated by the Court.
435 U.S. at 629. The decision in McDaniel nonetheless casts serious doubt on the constitutional validity of the underlying constitutional prohibition. See note 397 supra.
431. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Brennan, Marshall
and Stewart.
432. See notes 417-20 and accompanying text supra.
433. See notes 408-12 and accompanying text supra.
434. In distinguishing Torcaso, the plurality noted that the First Amendment extends
absolute protection to freedom of belief, which counsels against expanding the scope ofthl!t
provision for fear ofleaving "government powerless to vindicate compelling state interests."
435 U.S. at 627 n.7.
435. See id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
436. Id. at 626-27. See notes 410-12 and accompanying text supra.
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question of state law,437 the plurality interpreted the available authority
as indicating that "ministerial status is defined in terms of conduct and
activity rather than in terms of belief."438 Based on this reading of state
authority, the plurality concluded that the Tennessee statute's limitation was different from that in Torcaso which specifically limited the
right to hold public office to those who professed belief in God.439
Justice Brennan argued that the Court had no justification for
equating "status" with "activity." Referring to the fact that Torcaso's
refusal to declare a belief in God was viewed by the plurality as an act
based on religious belief whereas McDaniel's performance of the functions of a minister were not so considered,440 he stated: "I simply cannot fathom why the Free Exercise Clause 'categorically forbids' hinging
qualification for office on the act of declaring a belief in religion, but
not on the act of discussing that belief with others."441 Justice Brennan's disagreement with the plurality's distinction between belief and
activity apparently must await future Court terms for resolution. The
absence of a clear-cut guideline on this issue is likely to pose problems
for lower courts left in confusion as to what criteria to employ in determining whether certain activity involves freedom of belief so as to command absolute constitutional protection.
The members of the Court who utilized a freedom of religion analysis in McDaniel were in agreement regarding both the unconstitutionality of conditioning eligibility for office on the abandonment of
religious activity and the support for that conclusion provided by
Sherbert. 442 In relying on Sherbert, however, none of these justices responded directly to the argument relied upon by the lower court that
Braunfeld v. Brown 443 was controlling. In Brau'!leld, the Court sus437. The plurality simultaneously asserted that they were not bound by the Tennessee
court's resolution of the issue, but were only required to consider it. 435 U.S. at 627 n.5.
438. Id. at 627 (footnote omitted). For a criticism of this interpretation, see id. at 643 n.*
(Stewart, J., concurring).
439. See note 410 supra.
440. See 435 U.S. at 626-27.
441. Id. at 635 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart pointed out that the activity/belief dichotomy, as previously enunciated by the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940), reflected the Court's judgment that acts claimed to constitute a free
exercise of religion were still subject to judicial review so that "acts harmful to society
should not be immune from proscription simply because the actor claims to be religiously
inspired." 435 U.S. 643 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart asserted that McDaniel's disqualification was not based on his acts but rather on his beliefs. Id.
442. 435 U.S. at 626 (plurality opinion), 633-34 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
443. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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tained a Sunday closing law despite conceding that it necessarily made
the practice of religion by Orthodox Jewish merchants more expensive.
Their religious beliefs required them to close on Saturday and the state
law required them also to close on Sunday, thus resulting in two days
of lost business. The Braunfeld Court held that the state's interest in
having a uniform day of rest justified the "indirect burden" imposed on
Orthodox Jews by the closing laws.444
The Tennessee Supreme Court had found that the disqualification
statute, like the law at issue in Braunfeld, imposed only an indirect burden on McDaniel's free exercise of his religious beliefs.445 It held that
this indirect burden was justified by the state's interest in preserving the
separation of church and state, an interest even more compelling than
that asserted in Braunfeld.446 The Tennessee court distinguished
Sherbert on the ground that no compelling state interest could be
shown in Sherbert to warrant the state's denial of unemployment benefitS.447 The failure of any of the opinions in Mc.Daniel to respond to the
lower court's analysis of Braunfeld adds to the lack of standards for the
resolution of free exercise questions.
To a certain extent, the "indirect burden" doctrine enunciated in
Braunfeld was echoed by Justice White in his concurring opinion, in
which he chose to adopt an equal protection approach to the issues
presented. Justice White felt compelled to analyze the issues in
Mc.Daniel by reference to the equal protection clause because the plurality had failed "to explain in what way McDaniel has been deterred
in the observance of his religious beliefs."448 He argued that Tennessee's disqualification statute did not interfere with McDaniel's free exercise of religion since the minister was not compelled to abandon the
ministry or disavow any of his beliefs.449 This implicit adoption of the
indirect burden doctrine is susceptible to the same criticism made of the
Braunfeld decision-that there is nothing "indirect" about compelling
an individual to choose between the unfettered exercise of one's religious beliefs and the rights and privileges of citizenship, including
holding public office.
The various decisions of the justices in Mc.Daniel illustrate once
again the difficulty the Court has encountered in positing clear guide444. Id. at 606-07.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Paty v. McDaniel, Tenn., 547 S.W.2d at 905.

Id.
Id. at 907. See notes 408 & 409 and accompanying text supra.
435 U.S. at 643 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 643-44.
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lines for resolving the difficult questions arising under the free exercise
and establishment clauses. While the result in Mc.Daniel may be satisfactory in that it repudiates a doctrine long rejected by most states, it is
llIlfortunate that the Court was unable to base its decision on a common ground expressed in a single opinion.
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